by MrBill » Fri 13 Apr 2007, 02:57:57
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('CrudeAwakening', 'T')hanks for your comprehensive explanation, MrBill.
So it seems that the benefits to the US from pricing oil in dollars relate more to the various incentives for oil selling countries to retain their oil revenues as USD denominated assets, rather than simply the fact of pricing oil in USD alone?
A little bit more meat on the bones. Not up to date data, but as up to date as you can get. Still, it shows that the CBR did diversify away from the US dollar. And somewhat implies that this diversification did help the US dollar to lose ground against the euro. That supports the arguments made by many here that central bank diversification does cause the US dollar to fall, so the early birds impose those FX losses on the late diversifiers. In this case, China & Japan to name just two.
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', '2'). Russia, by contrast, did diversify. That isn't a surprise. Russia said as much last June.
Russia's total holdings of US debt rose by $35b between the end of June 2005 and the end of June 2006. Its bank deposits – best I can tell – fell by about $15b over the same period, for a net inflow of $19b.
During that period, the bank of Russia reports that it bought $91.4b of foreign exchange. If the Bank of Russia had wanted to hold the dollar share of its reserves constant at 70%, given fluctuations in the euro/ dollar and pound/ dollar, it would have needed to have bought about $70b of dollars. Cutting its dollar share from 70% to 60% would have implied about $45b of purchases. Bringing its dollar share down from 70% to 50% would have implied $20b or so of purchases.
Draw your own conclusions.
Actually, the US data isn’t definitive. Many countries hold a large share of their dollar reserves in the international banking system (India is one example, but Libya and Nigeria are others), so changes in US holdings are not a perfect proxy for changes in dollar holdings. Indeed, the fall in Russia’s “onshore” dollar deposits was likely offset by a rise in Russia’s “offshore” dollar deposits.
However, Russia also reports the valuation gains (and losses) on its fx portfolio. Judging from the size of its reported valuation gains, Russia hadn’t diversified in advance of the big dollar move in q2 but it had diversified in advance of the big dollar move in q4.
My guess is that Russia was actively diversifying during the second quarter, and quite possibly contributed to the dollar’s fall then. It then drew down its dollar balances to cover the big payment to the Paris Club in q3, bringing the dollar’s share of its total reserves down to around 50% by the end of q3.