by MrBill » Mon 18 Jun 2007, 04:36:12
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('seahorse2', 'M')r. Bill,
Not trying to insult anyone by using a place like Zimbabwe as an example, but, here's why I used it - an arguments has been advanced by PO advocates that PO would first be felt throughout the 3rd world, meaning, the third world would do without first before the "west" suffered the effects. Thus, I was wondering if there is any evidence of this. As you point out, there seems to be a contradiction, how can world economies grow if in fact world energy production has plateau for about 2 years now? Thus, I was wondering if there is any evidence to support the contention among PO advocates that the third world is feeling the effects first, by doing with less, and thus, the west is able to grow (albeit paying more for fuel), thus we can see growth in the west despite no increase in world energy production. I don't know, but would like to know if this is true or false.
Conventional wisdom was that poorer, developing countries would be the first to suffer from high energy prices, but that has not happened. At least not universally. Because commodity and base metal prices have also increased, along with more investment in resource extraction in these countries, so their external fundamentals have actually improved despite higher energy prices.
The exceptions, of course, are manmade Hell holes like Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe that has saw 90% economic contraction since he took power in the 1980s, while other developing countries have improved economically over the same period of time. Neighboring S. Africa has improved. In 2004 it accounted for 10% of Africa's population, but generated 45% of the continent's GDP. Since then high oil prices may have shifted that balance. I do not have the latest numbers at hand. And many of the white farmers kicked out of Zimbabwe have gone to neighboring Zambia, and as a result, as Zimbabwe's agricultural surplus is plummeting, Zambia's surplus as well as its farm payrolls and employment are booming.
In my opinion, it makes little sense to talk about macro-economic differences between north-south, or even south-south countries like those in Asia and Africa, which are symptoms, without speaking openly and honestly about good governance, corruption, crime, bureacracy/kletocracy and the underlying causes of those discrepancies.
My colleagues published a paper in the Journal of Long Range Planning on risk managment and the business environment in S. Africa. Recently, I read an article on Kenya in The Economist that reinforces some of our observations about the conditions that allow growth and prosperity to take root in these countries or what contributes to their demise.
The one word answer is, tribalism.
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', ' ') Tribe still beats class, any day
Tribalism, the motor of politics in Kenya, is as potent and prevalent as ever. Mr Kibaki, as a seasoned political operator, has the usual full range of ethnic groups represented in his cabinet. But there is little doubt that his own Kikuyu, who were in the driving seat from 1963 until 1978 under Kenyatta but then got pushed aside by Mr Moi, are back behind the wheel. “It is our turn to eat,” goes their refrain.
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The centre could not hold
Kenya often feels like a country that cannot cope. Driving around, in country or town, the sheer burgeoning mass of people hits the eye. The population has exploded out of control—with nothing like the rate of economic growth to sustain it. From around 1m people in 1900, the number of Kenyans had climbed to 4m after the second world war; though fewer than 8m at independence in 1963, Kenyans number more than 35m today. Recent projections suggest that, even taking account of the continuing ravages of AIDS, the population will exceed 40m in 2010, rising to 57m by 2025. Life expectancy went up from 44 years at independence to 62 in 1984, then slumped again, to 49 in 2000 and 52 today. Though the proportion of adults infected by HIV has dipped from a high of 14% in 1998, it still afflicts about 6%, or 1.3m people, says the UN. AIDS has orphaned more than 1m children.
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Scambags galore
Why the mess? The answer is misguided economic policies, mismanagement, poor maintenance, sloppiness, tribalism and corruption. This litany of failings is almost entirely the fault of Kenyans themselves: the politicians they have allowed to rule over them and rip them off; the civil servants and road builders (some of them foreign) who have skimmed off contracts or simply not bothered to do the job; and the dishonesty, venality and fatalism that have gripped society at large.
Corruption took hold of Kenya almost immediately after independence, as the regime of Jomo Kenyatta sought, in a hurry, to shift political and economic power from whites and Indians into the hands of a new African elite. After Kenyatta's death in 1978, his former vice-president, Daniel arap Moi, continued this system of patronage, authoritarian rule and personal family enrichment, while tilting the centre of gravity of power away from the Kikuyu to a much smaller cluster of Kalenjin-speaking tribes, of which his own Tugen people is one of the smallest.
The standard method by which this sort of system persists—the distribution of franchises, permits and visas, and the appointments to practically all the key jobs in government, the civil service and parastatal agencies by virtue of loyalty and tribe—helped the economy lose momentum. A new elite corruptly took an ever greater share of the fruits of independence and outside investors became ever warier.
We identified four types of risk. Political, economic, financial and operational risks. Then we added a time variable. The time dimension changes the nature of those risks. For example, using a country like S. Africa as a base of operations to distribute beverages to neighboring countries has one set of risks versus building a factory and incurring sunk costs to manufacture in those same countries. One is a cash on delivery model of distribution, while the other incurs longer-term risks from rent seeking kleptocrats, longer payback periods and the immoveability of the assets, etc.
In terms of securing energy supplies obviously some countries will be more successful than others in providing the necessary roads, ports, rail heads, refining facilities, distribution networks and the means to pay for those imports by creating an economic surplus or payment in kind. Corruption, bureacracy, red tape, incompetence and a crumbling infrastructure may mean that imports become more expensive and physically unavailable even for those willing and able to pay for them.
Certainly, if we speak about access to energy imports and the ability to pay for them then it will never be a level playing field. China's model of quasi central control or Japan's market approach may be in their own way more effective at securing those imports than Zimbabwe who generate very little export revenue, and what imports they do receive are arbitrarily allocated to friends of the government rather than where they will be used to best effect, further reducing potential GDP and the ability to import.
You can say the two issues are linked - energy availability and the ability to pay - but they are quite separate. The ability is a symptom of larger problems. Not a cause. And as any resource becomes scarcer we would expect prices to rise to ration demand. That means those who can pay will have more supply than those that cannot pay.
However, I do think that most of the economic growth we have seen since 2005 despite higher oil prices has come through efficiency gains in developed countries, not necessarily by price rationing a la demand destruction in places like Zimbabwe. Which on an interesting note means that if these shit-holes actually ran even as well as they did at indepence that likely total energy demand would be even higher than it is today, as they have been developing under their potential trend for the past 40-50 years, and in some cases experiencing negative growth.
Cruelly, even if they turn themselves around and address their domestic issues, the energy they need to grow may no longer be readily available. Fortunately, many of these countries do have other resources to trade, unless, of course, they are all under Chinese control?
Conclusion: If we did not solve poverty related issues in the developing world prior to peak oil then our chances post peak oil depletion will be slim to non-existant.