Hi,
A bit about myself. I lived in Russia until 1996 (and experienced a limited socio/economic collapse), then in the US. Occasional lurker on here and follower of sites like the Oil Drum and Orlov's writings.
1. I was a PO skeptic until about a year ago. Not that I didn't believe we'd eventually reach the peaking of oil extraction, but that there are easily replaceable technologies in place that would mitigate it (albeit perhaps with a few hiccups). I also regarded anthropogenic climate change as a far greater risk to industrial civilization.
2. This was probably mostly due to the fact that when I first came across PO several years back it was from an extreme "doomer" perspective, whose certainty in imminent collapse and obsession with guns, the "elites", canned food, etc, did not predispose me to them too much. What changed my mind was coming across the more evidence-based and mathematical arguments in concepts such as diminishing EROIE, net exports, geopolitical factors, etc. Particularly influential was my reading of Limits to Growth: The 30 Year Update, which tied in the trends of resource depletion and rising pollution ton to argue for global collapse within half a century, barring some kind of fundamental values shift or technological silver bullet. Far from being the doom-mongering non-evidence based tract it is frequently portrayed to be in the capitalist press, it is actually very reasonable and convincing.
3. My own view is that we are already close to a turning point, if not already then almost certainly within the next ten years. A turning point not in the sense that full-fledged collapse will necessarily begin right then, but that social and political trends now will determine twenty-first century outcomes.
If we move towards more global governance, radical plans for "contraction and convergence" on CO2 emissions and a concerted effort to use the remaining high EROIE energy sources to build up a less energy-intensive, more efficient, cleaner and renewable energy system, then we have good chances of avoiding catastrophe and actually making this century quite pleasant for most people. Though I am not a "cornucopian", I believe that some kind of technological singularity is attainable and that many more resources should now be directed to facilitate research in this direction (above all biotechnology, nanotechnology and AI), even if it forces big cuts in personal material consumption.
Realistically speaking, I've got to say I'm rather more pessimistic. Economic travails will only increase as long as we remain focused on material growth and as high EROIE energy sources dry up; the current recession/depression is the tip of the iceberg. In times of economic hardship, the kind of leaders that come to power are typically populist, authoritarian, corrupt and short-sighted. Technological research and long-term energy and environmental planning will be the first areas to be abandoned by them in favor of dispersing goodies to their supporters and guns to their strong-arms. I am very concerned that if we are indeed close to the brink now, then the technology level will be "frozen" at the level of the 2015 or so (until further collapse leads to actual regression).
So in effect I strongly disagree with the "moderate" or "centrist" notion that we'll muddle our way through as usual (10% chance). Either we change our values, or achieve stunning technological breakthroughs, and break through the limits to growth via a technological singularity (20% chance), or by mid-century there'll be mass die-off and industrial civilization will rot at the bottom of the Olduvai Gorge (70% chance).
4. I think it is important to have more research on these issues - the nature of economic growth, technological development, political developments, climate change and resource depletion, not separately but
in an integrated fashion. Achieving a good global understanding of this is vital to maximizing the chance of ending up with positive outcomes this century.
I intend to ask questions on these issues here. E.g. one example comes to mind. The estimates I've seen for the typical EROIE of wind power range from 20 to less than 1. How is it worked out specifically? What are the assumptions built in behind such vastly differing estimates? I also find some of the "compilation" threads here very useful.
After accumulating enough knowledge and notes, I hope to translate some of it into articles on my blog and tentatively on a book I'm planning about the history of the twenty-first century. (Hence the "Last Historian" usrname
