JD,
Thanks for the links. Here are my comments:
Regarding the DOE energy report:
The first thing I noticed about this report (it was not the one I was thinking of) is that it's chock full of diagrams without much explanation where the figures they represent come from. It seems to amount to little more than a complex picture book with some quasi-relevant footnotes. But I've little doubt that it compiles real statistics, and not imaginary numbers.
So, on page 3, there is a diagram that shows that petroleum makes up 40.13 % of our total energy supply considering all production and imports. Fossil fuels including natural gas and coal make up 85%. But the diagram measures energy in Quads, with no regard for economic issues. Since that's ultimately what this thread is about, and ultimately the real measure of the impact of peak oil, I suggest that we look at it from that angle.
Consider this: if it came out that oil really did just all of a sudden run out (I'm not suggesting that it will-this is just a thought experiment), would it matter to most people how many BTU's they could generate via the electricity flowing into their homes? Or, more precisely, would the fact that the BTU's they produce by driving their cars were not as significant a contributor to the overall total as were the BTU's they used in heating their homes? Of course, people want to heat their homes when it's cold, but if no one was able to drive to work or to the store, continued potential to run an electric heater would be little compensation, and would do little to avoid meltdown.
With that in mind, the graph on page 70 that shows we spend more money per mBTU on electricity. But this is rather less interesting than the one on page 74, which shows that we spend far and away more money on petroleum than any other energy source.
The question seems to be one of supervenience. Ulimately, it appears to me that oil is supervenient on other energy sources. Without diesel or gasoline, how are we to ship coal to the generators or fertilizer factories, or maintain our miles and miles of pipeline? Clearly, we'd have ways to do so, but it's going to cost us big time bucks to convert. We'll literally have to change our whole infrastructure.
Will we be able to afford it? I doubt it.
There are plenty of other interesting and what should be disturbing indicators in that report. For instance, on page 76, note that the transportation sector uses vastly more energy than any other sector, and that in turn means than more gasoline, kerosine, and diesel is purchased than anything else, even though per BTU right now, electricity is more expensive. That in itself indicates that a complete switch to electricity, even if it could be done, would be quite costly to maintain.
Note that on page 78, the value of imported petroleum products is at an all-time high.
On page 84, buried among other lines on various graphs, it appears that U.S. Uranium production has crashed.
On the same page, Coal production has also apparently crashed.
On page 90, foreign-partnered production seems to be flat if not in slight decline.
Strangely, Uranium production on the same page in the U.S. is up over the last few years; I'm not sure if this is meant to indicate that foreign companies are mining our Uranium, or that we're mining Uranium elsewhere. Also on the same page, foreign production of coal is soaring.
On page 107, there's an initially encouraging table that shows that we've doubled our rate of successful well drilling, but couple that with the data on page 104 that shows we're substantially reducing the number of exploratory wells, and it lends credence to the notion that the U.S. is fully explored. And in light of that, our success rate (44%) suddenly doesn't seem so high.
On page 110, costs per well and costs per foot are soaring steeply.
on page 206, note that surface mining of Coal is also soaring, though who's doing it in light of the graph on page 86 is left to mystery, while underground mining is flat. Looked at along with the data on 214 that shows the greatly increased productivity of surface coal mining, and the data on page 116 that shows that relatively little coal is available on the surface, and finally the information on page 226 that 50% of our electrical power is generated by Coal currently, and we might infer that the price of electricity will be going up as surface supplies dwindle.
And there are plenty of other disturbing trends that you don't have to look long and hard for by any means.
Regarding the link on Chinese fertilizer production:
I usually discount China when looking at these sorts of subjects just because it's very difficult to find good data by third party sources. But for discussion purposes, I will assume that commonly available information, including the report you cited, is correct. The fact that 60% of the fertilizer produced in China is made of coal doesn't necessarily tell us whether they've got a few large factories, or a bunch of small factories. In fact, it appears to be mostly the latter. They have relatively few factories that are producing large amounts of fertilizer, and of that total, few indeed do so from coal. See:
http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/mu3chfrt.htm
http://www.fadinap.org/China/IFDCchina.PDF
Reading between the lines on especially the second report doesn't paint so rosy a picture--coal production is subsidized heavily by government (only smaller plants are privately owned), and prices are fixed. I'm not able to find a firm figure for the cost per ton of nitrogen fertilizer produced in China, but it appears to be around $198.00 per ton domestically (at the fixed price--see
http://www.cpcia.org/articleview.asp?id=62), and about $230.00 per ton via export, which probably still doesn't come close to representing what a western company would charge for the same product, as profit margins for chinese companies are fixed pretty low.
By my calculations, adjusted for nitrogen by weight, this would cause an equivalent price of $410.00 per ton, whereas at regular margins, domestic anyhydrous ammonia fertilizer is $207.00 per ton. Figure back in a regular margin, and you'll see that Carbamide production is considerably more expensive than Anhydrous ammonia. For figures on % nitrogen in different fertilizers, see:
http://www.chemicalland21.com/arokorhi/ ... c/UREA.htm
Some other links of interest:
http://english.sohu.com/20050426/n225341710.shtml
http://en.ce.cn/Industries/Energy&Minin ... 8189.shtml
http://www.globalinsight.com/Perspectiv ... il1609.htm
In any event, my original remark was meant to compass anhydrous ammonia, though I grant that I should have specified as much.
So I guess my counter point would be a specific example of my general criticism of optimist arguments. You picked one or two fairly insignificant and qualified statements that I made and provided documentation against them. At the same time, you failed to respond to any of the main points; almost as if, had we been discussing the Cold War, you expected to win the debate by focussing on some obscure event in the late 1950's or something.
Of course, it is
possible to produce enough nitrogen fertilizer from coal and maintain agricultural outputs for some time. Of course, it is also
possible to play Russian Roulette a hundred thousand times and not shoot yourself. But as a doomer, I ask what is the most likely outcome, not what is possible. This is not enough, of course; I also find myself thinking, once I've arrived at what I think likely, what could be done with that as the starting point. But it's a two step process, the first must be completed before the second, and only by completing both is there any hope for improvement.