by kublikhan » Wed 26 Jun 2013, 02:44:29
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('Tanada', 'I') think the PRC is deliberately slowing their rate of growth because they do not want the citizens to get into the whole bubble creation cycle the west is so famous for. Even a 2% growth rate would exceed their population needs, after all how much percentage of the Chinese population do they want to own a private car? If you put 500,000,000 cars and SUV's on the road network you will grossly overwhelm the systems in place. The infrastructure and culture needs to catch up to what is practical and possible instead of what Hollywood says they should want.
Oh, I think it's too late for that. China was very successful in it's emulation of the West, particularly in regard to building bubbles. Now the best they could hope for is an orderly deleveraging, which is what the PBOC is currently attempting to engineer. The problem is such a large share of local Chinese governments are dependent on the bubble sector. They want more investment in infrastructure and real estate. One commentator called it a "treadmill to hell".
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'T')he Chinese model of economic growth is flawed. It has wasted resources on an unprecedented scale. Empty cities, excess industrial capacity and sour construction loans litter the country. New lending yields less and less incremental growth. And the very worst construction projects aren’t producing enough cash to service debts. The Chinese economy, like most others, rests on a shaky foundation of credit. The country has completed the largest building boom in history - a boom that depended on unsustainable growth in the supply of money and credit.
Short-term trust loans amount to an estimated 50% of Chinese GDP, so liquidity crises can quickly spiral into solvency crises. Local governments are big trust loan borrowers. They’ve reverted to bad, old infrastructure spending habits. The late 2012 revival in infrastructure spending may have been cut off when liquidity to fund trust companies dried up. Some trusts could be on the verge of defaulting.
The PBOC, in other words, will ensure liquidity is sufficient to allow for an orderly deleveraging of unviable shadow banking entities. But the deleveraging (credit contraction) process will not be stopped. A state-sponsored contraction of China’s shadow banking system is bad news for property developers.
The second Chinese government faction - the faction of speculators and crony politicians making money from the bubble - has no interest in ending the status quo: It financed projects through entities called local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). These are joint ventures between local governments and property developers. Local governments own the land. There are no real property taxes in China, so local governments earn tax revenue by selling land into these joint ventures. Then, they get a piece of the proceeds from development.
Political leaders concerned with stability and inflation seem determined to purge excesses. The will to reform and restructure will be tested, because the bubble’s excesses were staggering ... Short selling legend Jim Chanos is a vocal bear on China. He famously described the country as stuck on a “treadmill to hell.” In other words, Chinese leaders feel the need to sustain frantic levels of construction and infrastructure activity for fear that the economy would crash without it; yet more and more construction results in lower and lower incremental returns on investment.
Chanos illustrated the scale of China’s new office and residential apartment construction; it’s so enormous that it’s hard to grasp: 31-32 billion square feet of new office space was constructed in just 18 months after China’s 2008 bank-funded wave of stimulus. To put the number into perspective, it’s equivalent to a 5-by-5 office cubicle for every man, woman and child in China.Chinese banking system assets grew at 25% per year and the shadow banking system grew at 10% per year. Thirty-five percent credit growth never ends well, but it’s fun while it lasts.