by rockdoc123 » Tue 19 Jul 2011, 11:07:40
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'T')hese reserves keep enlarging and shrinking, almost by magic.
As far as Venezuela is concerned the increase and decrease in reserve sizes is mainly a product of changing oil price. Venezuela first became the big player in terms of reserve sizes when oil made its rush up to $100 the first time. That meant that both Venezuelan and Canadian heavy oil which were not economic at lower prices suddenly met the test for being classified as 2P reserves under the guidelines recommended by the SEC/AAPG/SPE working group (i.e 50% chance or greater that the volumes could be extracted economically).
In the past the SEC and other regulators used one particular day of the year (I think it was Dec 21) as the price which determined the reserve evaluations they would accept. This was revised a few years ago to be a past yearly average price.
So if in a particular year the average price was $90/bbl and Venezuela was able to book X bbls of oil reserves and in the following year the price dropped to $80/bbl on average then the reserves would have to be adjusted to X-Y bbls where Y is the amount of reserves which would be economic only if oil prices were >$80 and <$90. Again I remind everyone it is really important that it is clear what category of reserves/resources is being referred to. Is it 1P, 2P, 3P, contingent resource or potential resource that is being referred to? The effect of commodity pricing is different in either case as is the effect of technological advancement.
Note that the volumes for Venezuelas heavy oil fields are pretty well known given the fact that there was significantly more involvement of US companies when the majority of the fields were originally discovered. A lot of this information was published in various journals a long time ago.
I believe the real uncertainty with respect to Venezuelan reserves is in the determination of what can be classified as economic. Because Chavez has not been reinvesting in the existing oil field infrastructure and also as a result of most of the PDVSA technical excellence having gone elsewhere it is almost certain that considerably more investment to repair and upgrade existing facilites would be required (higher cost making the economic hurdle higher). The amount of capital that Chavez needs to strip from oil revenues to fund social programs also weighs on the economic value that a particular company can achieve. For example if the contractor take is only 10% in Venezuela versus say 20% in Algeria, the same barrel of oil in the same conditions in Algeria could be economic at a given price whereas it might not be in Venezuela. Because the government requires foreign investment to extract these reserves it is the contractor economics that determines what constitutes reserves.