Peak Oil is You
Donate Bitcoins ;-) or Paypal :-)
Page added on May 17, 2015
Turkish-Iranian Competition in the Middle East
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a formal visit to Iran on April 7, 2015. The trip was designed to try to repair bilateral relations after their severe breakdown linked to the crisis in Yemen. Indeed, the conservative wing of the ruling establishment in Tehran, including the head of Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Huseyn Nakavi, demanded that Erdogan’s Iran visit should be delayed (BBC–Turkish service, April 7). Some even warned the government that if Erdogan did not cancel the visit, the issue would be brought before Iran’s Guardian Council. Despite this negative pressure, the Turkish president did end up traveling to Tehran to clarify Ankara’s position (Radikal, April 7).
Four significant issues have contributed to this nadir in Turkish-Iranian relations: Iraq, Syria, Yemen and energy. Regarding Syria, the only area of agreement between Ankara and Tehran is their firm opposition to the Islamic State. However, Iran has continued to support the beleaguered Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey backs the united opposition. On Iraq, Turkey still sees Iran acting as a manipulator in bilateral Ankara-Baghdad relations. Although from time to time Tehran sends positive messages on this issue, in reality, these are tactical games on Iran’s part (Internet Haber, March 4). In recent months, as the war in Yemen continued to spiral out of control, Turkey has sided with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates and supported their international military action backing the embattled Yemeni regime. Iran, on the other hand, stands behind the Houthi rebels who are fighting on the other side of this conflict.
Over the past fifteen years, these regional issues have become increasingly contentious for Ankara and Tehran. The reason, as many experts contend, is related to the relative power of Iran in the region. For one thing, its power and ability to influence other regional actors has grown after the Arab Spring. Moreover, Iran has been strengthening regional Shia groups and building a crescent of influence in the Middle East. In addition, some have argued that Iran now feels more confident after reaching a framework agreement with the 5+1 Western countries on its nuclear program (Internet Haber, March 4; Radikal, March 18).
Another key point of contention between Turkey and Iran has become the issue of energy. “Turkey, as a country, is the largest consumer of [natural] gas from Iran, and yet it pays the highest price,” President Erdogan declared while in Tehran (BBC–Turkish service, April 7). Turkey expects a possible discount on the gas volumes it already imports from Iran; but Tehran has, so far, ignored these pleas. Speaking to journalists, on April 14, Iranian Fuel Minister Bijen Namdar Zengene said that Tehran’s proposal of lowering the gas purchase in exchange for Turkey buying double the volumes was rejected by Ankara. Annually, Turkey buys 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from Iran. Sources from the Turkish Ministry of Energy confirm that Iran proposed selling Turkey another 10 bcm of gas at a gradually decreasing price scheme, but without changing the price it charges Ankara for the first 10 bcm. Turkish Foreign ministry sources declared that this proposal was not acceptable to authorities in Ankara (Hurriyet, April 17).
In addition to the subject of energy sales, the website Iran.ru, controlled by the Iranian embassy to Moscow, earlier this year published an article criticizing Turkey’s developing role as a regional gas hub. “Turkey, as an ‘Energy Hub’ country, [will be] dangerous for Iran,” the article asserts, adding, “and Iran does not understand why Russia has been helping Turkey in this process. Russia supports Iran via strategic cooperation [but] assists Ankara on the energy issue—which is not preferable for these nations [Russia and Iran]. Russia must defend Iran’s interests” (Iran.ru, January 23).
Relations between Russia, Turkey and Iran are being influenced by a complicated set of cross-cutting and often contradictory interests. Ankara, expecting that its warm relations with Russia would bolster Turkey’s international role, has felt uncomfortable with growing Iranian strength in the Middle East as a result of improving relations between Tehran and the West (Iran.ru, February 27). For one thing, Turkey is concerned about the fact that Iran has not taken any firm action on helping to resolve the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, if the economic sanctions on Iran are terminated, the Islamic Republic could grow to become the preeminent power in the region. That is why Ankara is assisting Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in their campaign over Yemen (Hurriyet, April 24). This support clearly has a tactical dimension, particularly against the background of Turkey’s own disagreements with Saudi Arabia on Yemen. Moreover, relations between Ankara and Cairo have been virtually frozen after Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in Egypt two years ago (Turkiye, April 25).
Meanwhile, Turkish media has been hinting that relations with Israel might again come up for debate following Turkey’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 7. The geopolitical struggles in the Middle East are encouraging Turkey and Israel to rebuild a new, cordial relationship. But some experts infer that, in exchange for re-normalizing relations, Turkey will expect help from Israel on Syria. Without any dedicated alliances in the Middle East, Turkey is pursuing a series of tactical policy steps wherever it can find areas of common interest with other regional players. In the absence of any other allies in the Middle East, Turkey has been relying on political support from the United States—a fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member. But the insufficient backing it has received from Washington on the Syria issue has left Ankara feeling uncomfortable (CNN–Turkish service, April 24).
Turkey’s Middle East policy is thus in a current state of flux. But in its quest for new regional partnerships, it is unlikely to seek out either Iran or Russia. Rather, Turkey may be expected to seek closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia or re-build its relations with Israel. Recently, Turkey appears to have swung its attention more toward Saudi Arabia—President Erdogan attended the funeral of Saudi King Abdullah (Today’s Zaman, January 23) and later paid a formal visit to the country in March (Al-Monitor, March 3). These exchanges may herald a coming breakthrough in bilateral Saudi-Turkish relations in the near future. Though Turkey’s ultimate decision between moving closer to Israel or Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly have to wait until after the June 7 elections.
3 Comments on "Turkish-Iranian Competition in the Middle East"
rockman on Mon, 18th May 2015 6:30 am
“Turkey’s Middle East policy is thus in a current state of flux. But in its quest for new regional partnerships, it is unlikely to seek out either Iran or Russia.”. Me thinks the “natural gas Europe” folks might be trying to ignore the latest news from Putin. As far as “not making economic sense” that assumes one can predict Putin’s future actions. Good luck with that. LOL.
Bloomberg) — Russia plans to shift all its natural gas flows crossing Ukraine to a route via Turkey, a surprise move that the European Union’s energy chief said would hurt its reputation as a supplier.
The decision makes no economic sense, Maros Sefcovic, the European Commission’s vice president for energy union, told reporters today after talks with Russian government officials and the head of gas exporter, OAO Gazprom, in Moscow.
Gazprom, the world’s biggest natural gas supplier, plans to send 63 billion cubic meters through a proposed link under the Black Sea to Turkey, fully replacing shipments via Ukraine, Chief Executive Officer Alexey Miller said during the discussions. About 40 percent of Russia’s gas exports to Europe and Turkey travel through Ukraine’s Soviet-era network.
Russia, which supplies about 30 percent of Europe’s gas, dropped a planned link through Bulgaria bypassing Ukraine amid EU opposition last year. Russia’s relations with the EU have reached a post-Cold War low over President Vladimir Putin’s support for separatists in Ukraine.
Sefcovic said he was “very surprised” by Miller’s comment, adding that relying on a Turkish route, without Ukraine, won’t fit with the EU’s gas system.
Gazprom plans to deliver the fuel to Turkey’s border with Greece and “it’s up to the EU to decide what to do” with it further, according to Sefcovic.
Different Habits – “We don’t work like this,” he said. “The trading system and trading habits — how we do it today — are different.”
Sefcovic said he arrived in the Russian capital to discuss supplies to south-eastern EU countries after Putin scrapped the proposed $45 billion South Stream pipeline. The region, even if Turkey is included, doesn’t need the volumes Gazprom is planning for a new link, he said.
Ukraine makes sense as a transit country given its location in Europe and the “very clear specified places of deliveries” in Gazprom’s current long-term contracts with EU customers, Sefcovic said.
“I believe we can find a better solution,” Sefcovic said.
The 28-nation EU is planning build an energy union to reduce dependence on Russia and facilitate transition to a low-carbon economy. Russia was planning South Stream for about a decade, first claiming it would meet expanding demand in the EU, then saying would ensure supplies from high transit risks via Ukraine.
joe on Mon, 18th May 2015 10:43 am
Russia has lots of friends in europe, especially amoungst slavic peoples who see russia as a friend against muslim agression in europe, macedonia being the most recent example. In energy terms there is no model that does not include russia. anti russians see the islsmic world as the solution. Frankly I wouldnt want to rely on winter heat coming from islamic state either. The choice may become clearer soon, ‘change your politics, or change your religion’. What a choice just to get oil. Americans at least have the comfort of the devil it knows.
BobInget on Mon, 18th May 2015 5:45 pm
Just in.. Saudi Job Openings..
xRIYADH, May 18 (Reuters) – Saudi Arabia is advertising for eight new executioners, recruiting extra staff to carry out an increasing number of death sentences, usually done by public beheading.
No special qualifications are needed for the jobs whose main role is “executing a judgment of death” but also involve performing amputations on those convicted of lesser offenses, the advert, posted on the civil service jobs portal, said.
The Islamic kingdom is in the top five countries in the world for putting people to death, rights groups say. It ranked number 3 in 2014, after China and Iran, and ahead of Iraq and the United States, according to Amnesty International figures.
A man beheaded on Sunday was the 85th person this year whose execution was recorded by the official Saudi Press Agency, compared to 88 in the whole of 2014, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW). Amnesty said there were at least 90 executions last year.
Most were executed for murder, but 38 had committed drugs offenses, HRW said. About half were Saudi and the others were from Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, India, Indonesia, Burma, Chad, Eritrea the Philippines and Sudan.
Saudi authorities have not said why the number of executions has increased so rapidly, but diplomats have speculated it may be because more judges have been appointed, allowing a backlog of appeal cases to be heard.
Political analysts say it might also reflect a tough response by the judiciary to regional turbulence.
A downloadable PDF application form for the executioner jobs, available on the website carrying Monday’s date, said the jobs were classified as “religious functionaries” and that they would be at the lower end of the civil service pay scale. (Reporting by Angus McDowall; Editing by Robin Pomeroy)