Page added on October 20, 2015
The resilience of U.S. shale producers has surpassed all expectations as they have wrung extra efficiencies out of their operations and pulled rigs back to the most prolific sections of existing plays.
The shale sector’s ability to cut costs and sustain their output in the face of plunging prices has been extraordinary and testament to the entrepreneurial spirit and technical skill of the independent producers.
Shale producers are justifiably proud of their ability to survive the perfect storm that has hit their industry since the middle of 2014.
But it should not disguise the fact that the collapse in oil prices has paused the shale revolution, with the sector’s focus shifting from growth to survival.
The revolution cannot be reversed. Techniques once mastered will not be unlearned. And adversity has forced shale drillers to become more efficient.
If and when prices rise, shale output is very likely to start increasing again, and from an even lower cost base.
For the time being, however, lower prices have stunted shale’s growth in the United States and slowed its spread around the rest of the world.
In North Dakota, the oil boom has stalled as low prices have brought formerly rapid production growth to a standstill since the end of 2014.
State oil output grew at a compound average rate of just 0.38 percent per month over the last 12 months, according to records published by the Department of Mineral Resources.
By contrast, production increased at a compound rate of 2.37 per month in the 12 months before prices started to crash in June 2014 (http://tmsnrt.rs/1QOlGI8).
Output has been flat at 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) since the end of 2014, the deepest and most protracted pause since the shale revolution began in the state in 2005 (http://tmsnrt.rs/1QOn25S).
If production had continued rising on its pre-June 2014 trend, output would now be 330,000 bpd higher at 1.52 million bpd.
Some analysts question whether the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is winning its price war against high-cost producers.
They point to resilience in shale production in North Dakota and Texas as evidence that OPEC’s strategy has had only limited success.
But the correct comparison is with what would have happened if prices had remained at the pre-June 2014 level of over $100 per barrel and OPEC had cut its own production in a bid to support them.
In that case, North Dakota production would probably have grown to over 1.5 million bpd by now and reached almost 1.7 million bpd by the end of 2015.
By allowing prices to tumble, OPEC has shut in 300,000 to 500,000 bpd of probable shale production growth in North Dakota.
For the United States as a whole, crude and condensates production would have hit 11.3 million bpd by the end of 2015 if it had continued increasing along the pre-June 2014 trend (http://tmsnrt.rs/1QOkFQg and http://tmsnrt.rs/1QOlqsS).
Instead, the U.S. Energy Information Administration predicts production will end the year at around 9.0 million bpd (“Short Term Energy Outlook” Oct 2015).
The gap of more than 2 million barrels between actual and pre-June 2014 trend output illustrates why prices could not have remained above $100 and the crash was necessary to rebalance the market.
Herbert Stein, chief economic adviser to President Richard Nixon, once observed that “if something cannot go on forever, it will stop” (“Essays on economics, politics and life” 1998).
In the case of oil prices and the shale revolution, U.S. production was on an unsustainable trajectory so prices have fallen and the trend has stopped.
The 2 million barrel gap is also an indication of OPEC’s success shutting in shale production growth and pushing the oil market onto a new trajectory.
The 2 million barrel gap is a very rough calculation and should not be taken too literally: the real gap could be 1.5 million or even 1.0 million barrels.
But coupled with demand growth of around 1.5 million bpd in 2015, up from less than 1 million bpd in 2014, it is a measure of how far the oil market has come in terms of rebalancing.
The oil market remains oversupplied, but the oversupply would have been far worse if prices had not fallen by more than half over since the middle of 2014.
OPEC’s strategy, in reality a Saudi strategy, of holding output steady and forcing other countries to adjust their own production has been reasonably successful and there is no reason to discontinue it now.
In any event, it is not clear either Saudi Arabia or the organisation as a whole had much alternative in 2014, or has much choice now.
Some countries, including Venezuela and Iran, have indicated OPEC should cut production and aim for a price of $70 or even $80 per barrel.
But while most shale producers are struggling with prices below $50, many are ready to start increasing output again if U.S. crude prices hit $60 or $70, which would worsen oversupply in the short term.
There has been a lot of speculation about which countries are the intended target of Saudi Arabia’s and OPEC’s decision to maintain output, allow prices to fall, and curb high-cost production.
U.S. shale producers (authors of the shale revolution), Russia (for geopolitical reasons), and Venezuela (also for geopolitical reasons) have all been mentioned.
But Saudi and OPEC officials have been careful to say their target is to restrain “high-cost” production rather than shale.
Shale is mid-cost production, at least in the most prolific and well-understood plays like Bakken, Eagle Ford and Permian.
In any event, Saudi Arabia and OPEC cannot target any particular group of producers. The pain of low prices is widespread. OPEC has no control over who buckles first.
By increasing their efficiency, shale producers have pushed more of the adjustment onto non-OPEC non-shale producers (NONS) in the North Sea, the Arctic, deepwater, megaprojects and frontier areas, as well as weaker members of OPEC in Latin America and Africa.
4 Comments on "OPEC Has Stalled The Shale Revolution"
shortonoil on Tue, 20th Oct 2015 3:58 pm
On an $8.5 million Bakken well the difference in interest paid between historical rates (6.3% prime) and what those oil producers have been paying under ZIRP FED policy has accounted for $25/ barrel in reduced production costs. The survival of shale since the 2014 collapse in prices has had absolutely nothing to do with increased efficiency, better technology, and the other haphazard reasons promoted by RIGZONE. Their continued operation has been the result of the $13 trillion in excess liquidity that the FED has dumped into the economy since the collapse of Lehman in 2008. It has allowed for the continued financing of losing producers who would have otherwise been dealing with the Sheriff, and not the financial sector. Such blatant pimping of an obviously dying Ponzi scheme is repulsive, disingenuous, and dishonest.
rockman on Wed, 21st Oct 2015 6:40 am
“But it should not disguise the fact that the collapse in oil prices has paused the shale revolution…” They seem a tad confused: if the shale players have “…cut costs and sustain their output in the face of plunging prices…” then they haven’t “paused”, have they?
As far as “improved efficiencies”: in Jan 2014 there were 102 EFS wells that began producing with an average initial production rate of 729 bopd. In July 2015 (latest complete data from the TRRC) there were 65 EFS wells that began producing with an initial rate of 839 bopd. That would be a 15% increase in initial production rates. Beats a poke in the eye with a sharp stick but doesn’t do a great deal of good when half the rigs are shut down. Also the additional oil brought on line in July 2015 was 27% less than produced in Jan 2014. More efficient means more efficient. It doesn’t mean more production. In fact it doesn’t even mean the same amount of production. Yeah, I know I rained on the writer’s parade a tad. That’s the thing when you put unquantified generic statements as he makes up against FACTS. It can be a real bitch. LOL
And let’s not forget what the KSA is getting in return for the HUNDREDS OF $BILLION in revenue they’ll lose over the next few years if oil prices stay low: reduced new EFS output by 27%. Which would appear to be about 20,000 bopd (74k bopd in Jan 2014 less 54k bopd in July 2015). So in one of the two primary US shale plays low oil prices have reduced current global oil production by about 0.02%. I’ll let someone else run the numbers for the Bakken but I suspect they won’t be much different than the EFS. So maybe the high oil prices have crippled most of the US shale plays by about 0.05% of current global oil production.
Dang, that’s certainly has to be worth the KSA giving up $12 BILLION PER MONTH in revenue, isn’t it? LOL.
CAM on Wed, 21st Oct 2015 7:04 am
The assumption here is that shale oil is in vast unlimited abundance, and that when the price of oil goes up so will shale oil production. But shale oil is not unlimited, and the “sweet spots” have been exploited first, and continue even now to be exploited. Increased drilling efficiency has only allowed the industry to more quickly deplete the resource starting with the easiest to get oil. Going forward the plays will become more and more difficult and costly.
Kenz300 on Wed, 21st Oct 2015 9:27 am
The banks have stopped lending…………….
Cash is King………… the debt treadmill has stopped….