Nuke Guards Sabotage Own Weapons

Wackenhut Nuclear Services, Inc. (WNS) provides security related services to the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (Turkey Point), operated by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL or Licensee).

On February 24, 2006, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an on-site inspection of security-related matters at FPL’s Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. During the inspection, an investigation was initiated by the NRC’s Office of Investigations (OI), which was subsequently completed on August 23, 2006. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether WNS security personnel rendered contingency response weapons non-functional and whether information in FPL documents was inaccurate or incomplete in some respect material to the Commission.

A. In August 2005, a broken firing pin from a contingency response weapon was discovered at FPL’s Turkey Point facility. Based on an investigation, the NRC’s OI determined that a WNS security officer deliberately removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. This activity caused FPL’s Turkey Point Nuclear Plant to be in apparent violation of its Physical Security Plan.

B. In April of 2004, a WNS employee deliberately removed the firing pins from two contingency response weapons, rendering the weapons non-functional.

The NRC preliminarily concluded that the WNS security project manager engaged in deliberate misconduct in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5, in that he was aware at the time that the information documented in the CR was not complete or accurate. As a result, the WNS security project manager’s actions caused FPL to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, and caused WNS to be in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.5.

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