Energy security: at last, a response from the EU

But will the EU do it? Will it persuade Gazprom, Transneft and the Kremlin that they are dealing not with 27 `little platoons`, but an integrated and toughly regulated internal market?

Production at three of Gazprom`s four major fields is already declining. Even to maintain current levels of production, the International Energy Agency calculates that 200 bcm [bn cubic metres] per annum will need to be produced in new fields by 2015: a project which qualified experts believe demands $11 bn p.a. in investment. But such investment is not taking place. In the oil sector, the picture is no more encouraging.
Clarity is needed from Ukraine. This is because Ukraine is part of the EU`s energy problem: not only thanks to the Druzhba pipeline but because, with a GDP one-quarter that of Belgium, Ukraine is the sixth largest consumer of gas in the world.

New efficiencies and new investment demand an energy economy constructed on the basis of rules rather than deals. If Ukrainians who share this vision do not make themselves known in Brussels, then Ukraine`s `European course` will bear no resemblance to the EU`s European course.

Clarity is also needed, indeed candour, to counter the danger that the EU, armed with more scepticism than knowledge, will make decisions that impact unfavourably on Ukraine. In other words, Ukraine needs to demonstrate that it can be part of the solution.

An extensive analysis by James SHERR, Fellow, Conflict Studies Research Centre: Unian