Page added on July 16, 2009
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have strengthened its claim to areas of the East China Sea with the submission in May of its preliminary survey findings on the outer limits of its continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The submission, however, may also serve to exacerbate rather than resolve territorial conflicts in the area.
The submission makes a claim to an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) in the East China Sea (ECS).
In response to the growing Chinese naval presence in the East China Sea, pressure has been building on Japanese leaders to better enforce Japan’s maritime jurisdiction [10]. In light of Japanese concerns about the longer-term strategic consequences of Chinese behavior in waters claimed by Japan, Tokyo would view an increasingly assertive Chinese posture in the East China Sea as a threat [11].
In 2007, Tokyo took the first steps toward rectifying this situation by passing the Basic Ocean Law, which created an Ocean Policy Headquarters headed by the prime minister. Furthermore, the first piece of legislation passed on maritime affairs permits Japanese authorities to protect Japanese resource production installations in the East China Sea. This was intended to assuage concerns that Teikoku Oil workers and assets would be threatened by China if they were ever called upon to conduct exploratory drilling east of the median line. Indeed, last year the Diet began considering a law that would allow Japan to intercept suspicious vessels transiting its claimed waters [12].
While this is likely a legacy of Japan’s experience with North Korean espionage boats, it could just as easily provide the basis for an assertive Japanese response to non-authorized Chinese vessels. Recall that in addition to increased reports of Chinese naval incursions in the ECS in recent years, a Han submarine transited Japan’s territorial sea in 2004 and Chinese naval vessels routinely sail provocatively through the international straits that pass through Japan.
The two sides have yet to move forward in implementing the treaty called for by the June Consensus reached in 2008. This means proceeding with plans for Teikoku Oil to conduct joint operations at the Chunxiao gas field with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and commencing exploration in the joint development zone south of the Longjing field.
Leave a Reply