by Petrodollar » Thu 11 Dec 2008, 13:15:06
SeaHorse's post brings up a very important issue that has not recieved nearly enough scrutiny: Why didn't the Tresaury Dept puchase
any of the troubled/"toxic" mortgage assets as originally planned - in an effort to clean-up the balance sheets of the banks - which must be understaken if trust/interbank lending is to be restored - and thereby allowing credit to flow again? I have never heard a satisfactory answer given by Paulson re this issue. (His statements inferring that it would be "too complicated" or would "take too much time" really doesn't cut it.)
First, let's revisit the
prime reason for the TARP program:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troubled_A ... ef_Program
(excerpt from the Tresaury Dept itself)
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'A')ccording to a speech made by Neel Kashkari,[8] the fund will be split into the following administrative units:
1.
Mortgage-backed securities purchase program: This team is identifying which troubled assets to purchase, from whom to buy them and which purchase mechanism will best meet our policy objectives. Here,
we are designing the detailed auction protocols and will work with vendors to implement the program. 2.
Whole loan purchase program: Regional banks are particularly clogged with whole residential mortgage loans. This team is working with bank regulators to identify which types of loans to purchase first, how to value them, and which purchase mechanism will best meet our policy objectives.
3.
Insurance program: We are establishing a program to insure troubled assets. We have several innovative ideas on how to structure this program, including how to insure mortgage-backed securities as well as whole loans. At the same time, we recognize that there are likely other good ideas out there that we could benefit from. Accordingly, on Friday we submitted to the Federal Register a public Request for Comment to solicit the best ideas on structuring options. We are requiring responses within fourteen days so we can consider them quickly, and begin designing the program.
...so the
primary purpose of TARP funds was to remove the cancerous, illiquid mortgage related assets from the banks' balance sheets...but the auction process to purchase these assets was quietly dropped, and 6 weeks later - Nov 13th to be exact - Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said that the $700 billion government rescue program will
not be used to purchase troubled mortgage assets as originally planned.
Instead, Paulson announced a new goal for the program - to support financial markets with captial injections, which supply consumer credit in such areas as credit card debt, auto loans and student loans. However, as far as I can tell, this has not been very effective, and it is still unclear if and how this policy has been pursued.
Paulson has never adequately explained why he suddenly backed-off from the entire premise of the TARP program - and simply stated that purchasing illiquid Mortgage related "would not be the most effective use of TARP funds."(?!) Why the sudden change in strategy?
I have a theory...and this is where Seahorse is probably right about this critical change in strategy re the TARP funds:
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'T')he problem is, with this housing crisis and so many houses in default, the banks cannot possibly take the losses or mark the homes they hold down to their true value. If the banks told the truth and wrote the value of these assets down or sold them for less than owed, the banks would effectively bankrupt themselves. Thus, out of economic necessity, the banks do not mark the value of the houses down. Even though they show these homes as an asset on their books, they are really a liability because the bank has to maintain insurance on them and pay taxes. Ouch!
The bank regulators, the FDIC or the OCC can't possibly do their job and "examine" the books, otherwise, most banks would go into receivorship. So, the regulators turn a blind eye to all but the most egregious.
I concure. The essence of the problem is that most US banks now have too many hidden writedowns on their portfolios, and not enough capital to cover these writedowns. Paulson is allowing banks to 1) drag out their writedowns of bad loans/MBS/CDOs as long as possible, and 2) hoard every available spare dollar that is offered to them (at taxpayer expense), so they'll have as much capital as possible when they are forced to take writedowns. This will probably occur in 2009 when Paulson is gone from the scene...
...I suspect that Paulson realized three problems with the TARP program:
1) the required 20 to 25% macro write-downs in mortgage principle valuations to fair market value would greatly exceed the $700B in TARP funds - perhaps requiring approx $1 trillion or more (based on approx. $5 trillion in mortgage assets)...
2) the after shocks of these write-downs could endanger thousands of banks whose assets to liabilities ratios could plummet below acceptable limits and perhaps create a "run" on any bank that is perceived as remotely risky - given the size of the asset bubble created by the MBS market - despite the fact that the TARP program is designed to mitigate this risk.
3. and from a macro perspective - the ultimate holders of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) could sue the loan service orgnaizations over the write-downs, and perhaps
most fearful to the US Tresaury Dept - foreigners could divest themselves of US debt obligations as a consequence of the mark-downs.. The issue of foreign sentiments re US MBS holdings requires some elaboration...
First, no one seems to be able to independently verify who owns these hundreds of billions of Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and/or Mortgage-Backed Securies (MBS) assets, but my guess is that a huge chunk are actually owned by
foriegn nations (i.e., UK, Japan, Korea, Singapore, East Asia, etc) along with some large
Sovereign Wealth Funds who likely jumped into the MBS feeding frenzy circa 2004-2007 (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Russia, China, etc).
Over the past few months China and many others have realized the curse of the "globalization of the US sub-prime debt"- and they are not happy it. Last week the manager of China's SWF formally annouced that they are no longer investing in "western banks" due to risk.
Paulson must be concerned that foreigners are abondoning complex US financial "products" en masse - and that the demand for US dollars and the financing of the US current account could collapse in a disorderly fashion with the forced write-down of $1T+ in MBS related assets - assuming that foreigners own a majority of these assets. (Again, the % of foreign ownership stakes in these complex MBSs appears to be a quasi-state secret...)
In essence, I suspect that Paulson is deathly afraid to use the TARP to begin purchasing the illiquid mortgage assets b/c he doesn't have nearly enough funds to do so, and he doesn't want to risk the potential consequences if the foreign holders of US paper do not "play nice" when they get an approx. 25%+ "haircut" on their investments - investments that Wall Street originally sold to them as AAA-rated securities...
Anyhow, Paulson will be out a job in the not too distant future, and he is apparently punting this conundrum to the incoming Obama administration. I do not envy Obama's economic team, as the remaining $350 billion is not nearly enough to both capitalize the banks and buy-up those toxic assets.
Bottomline: Seahorse's description of the situation of US banks is probably, and unfortunately, not that far off the mark: 2008 will be remembered for the sudden demise of all five of the US Investment banks, and I am concerned that 2009 might be remembered for the near collapse - and quick nationalization - of a large number of US commercial banks.
We shall see...