by marko » Thu 24 Mar 2005, 12:36:29
Here are some responses to nth's questions.
You are right that most of the problems I mention have existed before in some form. However, they have not been anywhere near as large in relation to GDP. Most of these problems are at unprecedented levels, and they are occurring together in an unprecedented way, creating the perfect financial storm.
Let's start with the current account deficit, which is mainly a trade deficit. The US current account deficit is currently about 6% of GDP. This is an unprecedented percentage for the US and a percentage that has caused serious financial crises in other countries. The current account deficit is deteriorating at a rate of almost 1% of GDP per year, and the only foreseeable way to reduce this deficit is a severe recession in the US. What is also completely unprecedented is a rate of savings in the US that is near zero. This makes the US almost completely dependent on attracting savings from foreign countries, which will be hard to do if we have a recession and a falling dollar. Finally, we have a ratio of housing prices and mortgage debt to income that is unprecedented in the history of the US. This is true at the national level, but it is especially extreme when you look at this phenomenon on a regional level. In the Northeast and in California, the housing bubble and its associated debt are way beyond anything that has ever happened in the past. The collapse of that house of cards could send the regional economies of the San Francisco Bay Area, Southern California, Washington DC, Boston, and New York crashing, and along with them, many of the countries' financial institutions.
Add all of these things up, and it is clear that the next recession has the potential to spiral into something far worse than any of us has seen in our lifetimes.
In inflation-adjusted terms, recessions occurred in the 70s mainly as a result of oil prices around current levels. True, oil prices rose to around $80 a barrel in current terms during those recessions, but the recessions were started by prices no higher than the current ones. Now, I have seen the argument that our economy is now less petroleum-intensive than it was in the 1970s, though I have also seen that argument debunked. What I am wondering is why you set a threshold so high, at $84? I would expect to see a recession if oil prices are sustained much above $70.
Price is just a rationing device. Rising prices indicate that supply is insufficient to meet demand at the previous price point. So rising prices in fact indicate shortage. As prices rise, they cut into producers' profits and/or consumers' ability to purchase other goods (or service their debt). Eventually producers are likely to resort to layoffs to maintain profits. This is how rising prices can cause a recession, even if in global terms the volume of supply is rising slightly.
The historical ratio of adjustable to fixed rate mortgages is not the point. The point is that the size of these mortgages relative to income is unprecedented, such that buyers can ONLY afford those mortgages if their interest rates remain at historically low levels. This is what is new.
Yes, but that happened in a context in which domestic savings were relatively high and the US was not dependent on nearly $3 billion of foreign lending every business day. When it becomes clear how risky those loans to the US really are, private foreign investors are going to stop lending us money or require substantially higher interest rates, which will intensify a debt crisis that will tend to spiral out of control.
Yes, my scenario is predicated on a collapse of the financial and retail sectors, both of which have been propped up by unsustainable foreign lending. I thought that I made that clear in my earlier post. Sorry for any confusion
Yes, it does sound like the Great Depression, doesn't it? Except that during the 1930s, the US was a net creditor, not a net debtor, and was not dependent on a flow of foreign lending. Also, in the 1930s, the US had a current account surplus. This was because the US had a very strong manufacturing sector. These things all set a floor for the Great Depression such that unemployment never exceeded 30%. I think that we are likely to see unemployment of 50% when our economy collapses, because our economy no longer produces many things that people in other nations want, or even many of the things that US consumers need.
That said, I do think that a collapse of the dollar and of wages will set the stage for a revival of US manufacturing, probably based mainly on coal and nuclear power, but this will take years to rebuild, and these will be years of great hardship for most Americans.
True. And I sincerely hope that I am wrong about this, too. I personally do not have enough resources to weather the kind of collapse I have described without a lot of personal hardship. I hope that I am wrong, but I do not see a plausible way to avoid this, given the present constellation of factors.
The one thing that might possibly save us from this financial peril would be a US government that very proactively intervened to correct the most dangerous conditions, like the federal budget deficit (which adds nearly 6% of GDP to US demand for credit), and the dangerously low rate of savings. The government could address both problems in one fell swoop by increasing taxes, and particularly consumption taxes, which could be targeted at the top earners who gained a windfall from Bush's tax cut. There should also be a tax on financial transactions to shore up a shaky financial system.
Personally, I think that the US also needs to quit the WTO and either quit or renegotiate NAFTA, because our current trade relations, particularly with China, are doing great long-term harm to the economic base of this country.
Of course, none of these policies has a snowball's chance in hell with the current administration. So we seem to be doomed.
Yes, Europe will see losses on its US subsidiaries. Some European firms may even fail as a result. Europe will see a severe recession. But as a percentage of total profits of all European firms, I don't think that US revenues come to more than single digits. Likewise trade with the US as a percentage of euro-zone GDP. Add these two up and you may have a hit to the euro-zone economy of around 10-15% of GDP. This is indeed a very severe recession, but nothing like the collapse that I see for the US and Asia.
But this isn't really my point. My point is that everyone recognizes that this situation is unsustainable. The Europeans know that they are going to have to write off the US sooner or later. I think that they will choose to cut their losses when the US economy collapses. The size of the US imbalances is so great that they would probably swamp any European attempt to "save" the US and pull the European economy into a collapse right along with the US and Asia. European central bankers and investors are prudent, unlike most in the US. I think that they will choose to cut their losses while they can and take a severe recession rather than throw good money after bad and risk a total collapse of their own economy.
I think that it will happen within the next 7 or 8 years almost for certain, and probably within the next 3 to 4 years. As I have said, I do see hardship on a global scale. And I do think that US hegemony will erode.
On the geopolitical front, by the way, I am a little more hopeful than some. I think that the extreme financial and economic weakness of the US will force it to sharply cut back on its overseas military operations. With Russia remaining weak economically and China also greatly weakened, I actually see a lessening of tensions globally. The economic decline will reduce demand for petroleum and put off the most difficult consequences of the oil peak. Geopolitically, regional powers such as Iran, India, and Brazil will have greater relative importance. Europe would probably continue to take a more independent political stand. But that could well increase stability, at least in the short run, with the regional powers acting as buffers and courting more than one larger power at a time.