Hot Commodities : How Anyone Can Invest Profitably in the World's Best MarketJim Rogers made his fortune as a hedge fund manager in the 1970's, a decade that most investers associate with economic malaise, and retired at the ripe old age of 37. Like many, I was enthralled with his narrative in the book
Investment Biker of a motorcycle tour that he took around the world with an attaractive female companion in the early 1990s. His second book,
Adventure Capitalist, chronicled a second trip through 116 countries that Rogers made with a second beautiful woman (now his wife) straddling the Millenium. Both books provide an educational and entertaining mix of adventure, investment insight and a view of different countries and cultures that can only be gleaned from on the ground experience. There are many reasons to envy Jim Rogers and the life he has made for himself.
The central theme of
Hot Commodities is that equity markets and commodities take turns advancing as part of the normal business cycle. The 1970s was bearish for stocks, but unbelievably bullish for commodities. Rogers believes that a similar trend began in 1998 and will continue until at least 2011, and presents substantial economic data in support of his thesis. The two main factors Rogers identifies as driving the current commodities boom are depletion of existing sources and increasing world demand fed by the rise of China as an economic power.
Oil depletion factors large into Roger's analysis, but is just a subset of a bigger picture of changing supply and demand for an entire range of commodities. The book devotes an entire chapter to oil, describing Hubbert's Peak Oil model and the projections of energy experts such as Matt Simmons. Rogers has pored over the same IEA Oil Market Reports that I have, and not surprisingly has reached an identical conclusion- that at the end of 2004 world oil supply was 83.5 Mb/day and declining, while demand was 82.4 Mb/day and rising. Looking at the situation through the prism of a commodities investor, he sees a developing imbalance between supply and demand that usually marks the beginning of a long-term secular bull market.
According to Rogers, the end of a commodity bull market is usually characterized by a supply overcapacity that develops over time due to investments in infrastructure that are spurred by the rising prices. Again, he predicts that the current bull market will extend until at least 2011.
In the case of oil, however, Rogers isn't exactly predicting a buildup of supply capacity, which is interesting as philosophically he has much in common with the so-called "cornucopian" economists who predict that the free market will ensure a never-ending stream of abundant oil. He notes two simple facts that are well known to those who have studied the issue: (1) that no large oilfields have been discovered in over 35 years; and (2) that oilfields invariably deplete. He also notes that the two most likely sources of increased oil supply in the geologic sense are Saudi Arabia and Russia. As readers of
Adventure Capitalist know, Rogers views Russia as a kleptocracy and has long been pessimistic of its chances for real economic growth. For the same reasons, he does not see Russia as a reliable source for increased oil supply; he sees profits from existing production ending up in Swiss bank accounts rather than being invested in infrastructure. In the case of Saudi Arabia, he notes the reservations that some experts (notably Matt Simmons) have about the reliability of Saudi reserve estimates and potential for increased production. He remains agnostic on the issue, but notes he has done well in the past when betting against conventional wisdom.
After describing a number potential alternative energy sources and concluding that they are hardly adequate as a substitute for oil, Rogers ends the chapter with a simple note: It's a good time to buy some oil. While this advice is eminently practical from an investment standpoint (I certainly intend to follow it), I find Rogers' analysis somewhat lacking in that it fails to take into account consequences of the second order: how oil supply shortages and the resulting high prices will affect the industrialized world's economy, and what that in turn will do to demand for the other commodities he discusses. He does point out in the book that a poor economy didn't stop commodity prices in the 1970s from going through the roof. In the 1970s, though, it was clear that the disruption in oil supply was largely political and temporary. I think it is reasonable to expect that a prolonged and perhaps interminable decline in oil supplies will do much more serious damage, both economically and politically. Certainly, I think mid-term investments in such commodities as oil, lead (used in deep cycle storage batteries), copper (hybrid cars use a lot) and natural gas (we're running low on this too, at least in North America) are almost certain winners.
In the long run, though, an investment in arable farmland with a good wood lot, horses and loads of ammunition might pay off more.