by Magus » Sun 30 Jul 2006, 22:03:44
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('Jack', '')$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('Magus', '
')Sorry, but moral relativeism is just a cop-out. One of the defining characteristics of evil, is that it doesn't like to be shown for what it truly is. Much better to pretend that it's actions are "justified."
I prefer the one's who openly admit they are evil incarnate to that crap.
Umm? And upon what foundation should one base moral absolutism?
I don't want to turn this into a debate about philosophy...but I believe this to be much closer to my stance...
Moral Objectivism$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'M')oral objectivism and free will
Semi-religious arguments for moral objectivism have to do with the relationship between free will, choice, and morals. Some have argued that without free will, the universe is deterministic and therefore morally uninteresting (i.e., if all moral choices and moral behavior are determined by outside forces, there can be no need for any person to ponder morality), though this would depend on whether free choice is required for an action to be 'moral'. If free will exists, it stands to reason that the universe allows moral behavior. From this, some believe this feature is integral to the universe's reason for being. A softer, more theological, line of reasoning is that God may 'need' to permit us to have choices, but leaves the concerns of those choices (and their consequences) up to the people making them. In this case, moral objectivism is a subjective decision (i.e., free will must, by definition, include the freedom to choose what is moral).
These views are generally not accepted by those who deny free will. Some, in fact, deny free will and still accept moral objectivism — and argue that these two beliefs are inextricably tied.
[edit]
Criticism of moral objectivism
A primary criticism of moral objectivism regards how we come to know what the 'objective' morals actually are. In science one can perform objective empirical tests of claims, but there are no such objective tests for moral claims. At best one can point to a widely accepted authority. But if this authority has no objective way of obtaining moral truths itself, then our knowledge through that authority is still corrupted by subjectivity. In addition the authorities quoted as sources of objective morality are all subject to human interpretation, and multiple views abound on them. If morals are to be truly objective, they would have to have a universally unquestioned source, interpretation and authority. Therefore, so critics say, there is no conceivable source of such morals, and none can be called 'objective'. They claim that even if there are objective morals, there will never be universal agreement on just what those morals are, making them by definition unknowable.
Proponents of theories of objective morality, however, counter these criticisms from two angles.
First, they claim that these criticisms essentially amount to attacking metaphysics with epistemology; they hold that, even if it were impossible to know the substantial nature of objective morality, that would not mean that it is not metaphysically objective. A critic might, in turn, respond that this completely undermines the very value of an objective truth: a moral truth which it is impossible to identify can serve none of the purposes (namely, to inform behaviour and judgment) for which it is relied upon, so leaves the world in no better a position to resolve moral disputes than if moral relativism (or even moral nihilism) were the case.
Second, they argue that consensus and truth are not necessarily equivalent — a proposition does not need to be universally held to be true for it to be actually true, and that a proposition may indeed be universally held to be true does not mean that it is actually true.