Hmm, if they get civil war then the Iraqi's will help kill themselves. We could just pull out a while and then come back and fight what's left.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/25/news/baghdad.php
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'B')y John F. Burns The New York Times
The first signs that top U.S. officials in Iraq were revising their thinking about what they might accomplish in Iraq came a year ago. As Iraq resumed its sovereignty, the new American team that arrived then, headed by John Negroponte as ambassador, had a withering term for the optimistic approach of their predecessors, led by L. Paul Bremer 3rd.
The new team called the departing Americans "the illusionists," for their conviction that the United States could create a Jeffersonian democracy on the ruins of Saddam Hussein's medieval brutalism.
One U.S. military commander began his first encounter with American reporters by asking, "Well, gentlemen, tell me: Do you think that events here afford us the luxury of hope?"
It seemed clear then that the Bush administration, for all its public optimism, had begun substituting more modest goals for the idealists' conception of Iraq. Just how much more modest has become clearer in the 12 months since.
From the moment U.S. troops crossed the border 28 months ago, the specter hanging over the enterprise here has been that Iraq, freed from Saddam's tyranny, might prove to be so fractured - by politics and religion, by culture and geography, and by the suspicion and enmity sown by Saddam's years of repression - that it would spiral inexorably into civil war.
If it did, opponents of the invasion warned, U.S. troops could get caught in the crossfire between Sunnis and Shiites, Kurds and Turkmens, secularists and believers - reduced, in the grimmest circumstances, to the common target of contending militias.
Now, events are pointing more than ever to the possibility that the nightmare could come true. Recent weeks have seen the insurgency reach new heights of sustained brutality. The violence is ever more centered on sectarian killings, with Sunni insurgents targeting hundreds of Shiite and Kurdish civilians in suicide bombings. There are reports that Shiite death squads, some with links to the Interior Ministry, are retaliating by abducting and killing Sunni clerics and community leaders.
The recent quickening of these killings, particularly by the insurgents, has led many Iraqis to say that the civil war has already begun.
That at least some senior officials in Washington understand the gravity of the situation seems clear from remarks made at the Foreign Press Center there two weeks ago by Zalmay Khalilzad, Negroponte's successor as ambassador. In his remarks, Khalilzad abandoned a convention that had bound senior U.S. officials when speaking of Iraq: To talk of civil war only if reporters raised it first and then only to dismiss it as a beyond-the-fringe possibility.
Using the term twice in one paragraph, he spoke of civil war as something the United States must do everything to avoid.
"Iraq is poised at the crossroads between two starkly different visions," he said. "The foreign terrorists and hardline Baathist insurgents want Iraq to fall into a civil war."
The new ambassador struck a positive chord, to be sure, saying that "Iraqis of all communities and sects, like people everywhere, want to establish peace and create prosperity." Still, his coda remained one of caution: "I do not underestimate the difficulty of the present situation."
One measure of the doubts afflicting U.S. officials here has been a hedging in the upbeat military assessments that generals usually offer, coupled with a resort to statistics carefully groomed to show progress in curbing the insurgents that seems divorced from realities on the ground.
One example of the new "metrics" has been a rush of figures on the buildup of Iraq's army and police force, a program known to many reporters who have been embedded on joint operations as one beset by inadequate training, poor leadership, inadequate weaponry and poor morale.
The war's wider pattern has always held the seeds of an all-out sectarian conflict, of the kind that largely destroyed Lebanon. The insurgency has been rooted in the Sunni Arab minority dispossessed by the toppling of Saddam, and most of its victims have been Shiites, the majority community who have been the main political beneficiaries of Saddam's ouster.
Shiites have died in countless hundreds at mosques and marketplaces, victims of ambushes and bombs.
Now there have been persistent reports, mostly in Baghdad, that Shiite death squads in police uniforms are abducting, torturing and killing Sunni Arab clerics, community leaders and others.