by kublikhan » Sat 07 Nov 2015, 14:43:38
The article talks about Bostwana diversifying it's diamond dependent economy into a strong agriculture economy. Saudi Arabia tried that. They poured enormous amounts of money and non-renewable water into trying to become self-sufficient in agriculture. Turns out, growing wheat in the desert is not such a good idea. Saudi Arabia's adventure in agriculture turned into a massively expensive failure. It's not that the elites didn't try to diversify.
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'B')eginning in the early 1980s, however, Saudi Arabia spent enormous amounts of money and exhausted massive volumes of water from mainly nonrenewable aquifers in an ostensible effort to achieve food self-sufficiency. On January 8, 2008, the Saudi government abandoned its food independence strategy and decided instead to import the country’s entire wheat needs by 2016.
Farming is alien to the desert habitat and the culture of its peoples. Scant rainfall of only 70-100 millimeters a year constrained Saudi food production and population growth. Having almost no expertise in settled farming, Saudi investors were induced by huge government subsidies to import the technology, equipment, seeds, fertilizers, engineers, and the farm workers required by these projects. As may be expected from a strategy declared in the name of food independence, wheat growing was emphasized. Within 12 years, between 1980 and 1992, wheat production grew 29-fold–from 142,000 tons in 1980 to 4.1 million tons in 1992.
Beginning in 1993, however–under pressures from low oil prices since the second half of the 1980s, heavy spending on defense and security, the cost of the Iran-Iraq (1980-1988) and 1991 Gulf wars, and the cost of maintaining the expensive lifestyle of some 4,000 immediate members of the al-Saud ruling family–the government had to scale down its wheat-growing subsidy program. Within four years, by the end of 1996, 76 percent of the new wheat-growing surface added between 1980 and 1992 were abandoned–650,000 hectares out of the 857,000 hectares. Wheat production dropped during the same period by 70 percent. On January 8, 2008, Reuters and other news agencies, quoting officials from the Saudi Arabian agriculture and finance ministries, reported that purchases of wheat from local farmers would be reduced by 12.5 percent, with the aim of relying entirely on imports by 2016.
THE FINANCIAL COST
For the sixteen years between 1984 and 2000, it may be estimated that the assessable cost of Saudi agricultural development could be put at about $85 billion, representing 18 percent of the country’s $485 billion in revenues from oil exports during the period. This huge investment produced wheat at an average cost of more than US$500 per ton. During the same period, the international market price for wheat averaged about $120 per ton. When the waste resulting from abandoning the newly reclaimed and irrigated lands plus four unquantified government subsidies are added, the cost might more than double.
THE WATER COST
In the searing desert sun, the water needed to irrigate a hectare of land to grow agricultural produce is twice to three times the volume needed to grow the same produce under temperate conditions. Between 1980 and 1999, a gargantuan volume of water–300 billion cubic meters (m3), the equivalent to six years’ flow of the Nile River into Egypt–was used in Saudi Arabia’s agricultural adventure. Two-thirds of the water thus used is regarded as nonrenewable, according to estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water (MAW). At this rate, Saudi nonrenewable water reserves will sooner or later be depleted if the extraction does not stop.
Saudi Arabia’s Agricultural Project: From Dust to DustVideo: Agriculture in Saudi Arabia: failure of Saudi agriculture policy
The oil barrel is half-full.