by vox_mundi » Fri 20 Mar 2015, 21:47:08
Relax. Drug resistant bacteria or virus will probably get yah. Of course, the Chinese can do almost everything we can do.
Cyber Commander Expects Damaging Critical Infrastructure Attack$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'A')dm. Michael Rogers, USN, who leads both the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, predicts a damaging attack to critical infrastructure networks within the coming years. If an attack happens, the agency and Cyber Command will coordinate a response along with other government agencies and potentially the private sector organizations that own many of the networks.
Critical infrastructure is the backbone of the nation’s economy, security and health, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It includes the systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, the economy or national public health or safety. It also includes broadband and wireless networks and the massive power and communications grids.
“I fully expect that in my time as commander, someone—whether it’s a nation-state, group or individual—will attempt to engage in destructive activity against one of those, if not more than one,” Adm. Rogers says.
Targeting SCADA SystemsU.S. Cyber Command Presentation: Assessing Actions Along the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations
Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', '.').. Chinese capabilities in computer network operations have advanced sufficiently to pose genuine risk to U.S. military operations in the event of a conflict. A defense of Taiwan against mainland aggression is the one contingency in the western Pacific Ocean in which success for the United States hinges upon the speed of its response and the ability of the military to arrive on station with sufficient force to defend Taiwan adequately. PLA analysts consistently identify logistics and C4ISR infrastructure as U.S. strategic centers of gravity suggesting that PLA commanders will almost certainly attempt to target these system with both electronic countermeasures weapons and network attack and exploitation tools, likely in advance of actual combat to delay U.S. entry or degrade capabilities in a conflict.
The effects of preemptive penetrations may not be readily observable or detected until after combat has begun or after Chinese computer network attack (CNA) teams have executed their tools against targeted networks. Even if circumstantial evidence points to China as the culprit, no policy currently exists to easily determine appropriate response options to a large scale attack on U.S. military or civilian networks in which definitive attribution is lacking. Beijing, understanding this, may seek to exploit this gray area in U.S. policymaking and legal frameworks to create delays in U.S. command decision making.
The decision to employ computer network operations and INEW capabilities rests with the senior political and military leadership and would be part of a larger issue of employing force during a crisis. Once that decision was made, however, the operational control for the military use of CNO rests with the PLA’s Third and Fourth Departments of the General Staff Department (GSD). The Third Department (3PLA), China’s primary signals intelligence collector is likely tasked with the network defense and possibly exploitation missions. The Fourth Department (4PLA), the traditional electronic warfare arm of the PLA, likely has the responsibility for conducting network attack missions.