The long term (1930 to 2005) and 2002 to 2005 rates of increase in global C+C production were about the same, on the order of about 3%/year. "Gap" Charts for Global C+C and for Global Net Exports (total petroleum liquids + other liquids) follow, showing the gaps between where we would have been at the 2002 to 2005 rates of increase versus actual post-2005 data, by year. Of course, annual Brent crude oil prices approximately doubled from $25 in 2002 to $55 in 2005, and then doubled again, from $55 in 2005 to $112 in 2012 (with one year over year annual decline, in 2009).
Note that I estimate that we have already burned through about one-fifth of post-2005 Global CNE (Cumulative Net Exports). A similar extrapolation for the Six Country Case History* produced a post-1995 CNE estimate that was too optimistic.


*Six major net exporters, excluding China, that hit or approached zero net exports from 1980 to 2010.
Link to ECI article and excerpt from same:
http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013- ... city-index$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'W')e know what the six year ECI decline meant for the Six Country Case History, and we know that we are seeing similar ECI type declines for Saudi Arabia, Global Net Exports and Available Net Exports.
The key question is why would the outcome for global net exports be materially different from the Six Country outcome?
My basic premise is that the net oil importing OECD countries are maintaining something resembling “Business As Usual” only because of huge and almost totally overlooked rates of depletion in post-2005 Global and Available Cumulative Net Exports of oil.
(Post-1992 production as a percentage of 1992 production, versus remaining post-1992 CNE, by year)