by Loki » Tue 05 Feb 2013, 17:12:26
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'W')ell there is no *recovery*. There is an expansion of debt, inflation, continued currency debasement and a lot of low-paid jobs, with a DOW that in gold price terms is actually half the value it was the last time it was at 14,000.
You can't have a recovery if your economy is increasingly going the way of Zimbabwe's. Imagine come the next crunch, if this is the best *recovery* your political and financial shenanigans can buy?
Despite our current stagnation, there has been a bit of a bounce back up from the bottom we hit in 2009-10; whether it's a genuine recovery or a dead cat bounce has yet to be determined. Unemployment is my main metric for this, not GDP or the stock market, though both also show improvement since we hit bottom.
And valuing the DOW by referencing the price of gold doesn't seem like a particularly useful method to me. Current gold prices are being driven by Asian demand, not US “currency debasement”; the vast majority of the newly printed US dollars have not entered circulation, and even if they did, it would likely just cause run of the mill inflation, not Zimbabwe-style hyperinflation.
Those who are focused on hyperinflation clearly don't understand the nature of this recession. It's a balance-sheet recession, which means it was caused by excessive private debt. It is overwhelmingly deflationary in nature. The Fed has been pulling out every stop to prevent deflation, and they've succeeded surprisingly well, so far at least. But I agree with Kublikhan that the only solution to a balance-sheet recession is deleveraging, which has only just begun. As soon as we see fedgov austerity really kick in, and it will when the GOP gains full control of Congress in 2014, we'll see a tsunami of private deleveraging in the US, just like we did in 1937, and just like Japan did 60 years later.
Australian economist Steve Keen recently addressed this:
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'A')s arguably the heretic-in-chief, my key proposition has been that this crisis was driven by a fundamental change in the behaviour of private debt. Every post-WWII recession has ended when private debt started to grow more rapidly than GDP – and in a trend that was ultimately unsustainable. I and a handful of others punted that this crisis would be the one where that unsustainable trend broke down, and a process of deleveraging would commence akin to that which caused the Great Depression.
The debt data now confirms that so far, that punt has proved correct. Some asset market development might yet temporarily reverse the trend – rising house prices in the US could conjure a return to leveraging by the household sector, for instance – but it appears that while actual deleveraging has been constrained, the days of private debt rising faster than GDP are over. Certainly, there has been no other post-WWII period in which private debt to GDP levels have fallen for as long as they have since the late 2000s.
Figure 4: Debt to GDP over the long term in the Anglo-Saxon economies

This is also why economic growth hasn’t recovered to pre-crisis levels: because the rate of growth of private debt hasn’t recovered. This is both a good and a bad thing. It’s good, because that rate of growth of debt relative to income wasn’t sustainable anyway: debt can’t indefinitely grow faster than income, and the period which we took as normal was in fact an abnormality that had to end. It’s bad, because with private debt now stagnant, economic growth will be too because – up to a point – a capitalist economy needs rising private debt if it is to grow....
In these circumstances, it’s – pardon the pun – depressing that politicians continue to obsess about rising government debt. Far from being the cause of the current malaise, as they seem to believe, the cash flow that government deficits inject into the economy is the only factor that is keeping private sector economic activity ticking over, and dissuading the private sector from deleveraging. I don’t see deficits to counter private sector deleveraging as either the sole or the ideal solution – private debt should be directly reduced as well – but reducing deficits via the fetish for government surpluses risks generating a modern version of the "Roosevelt Recession" by triggering private sector deleveraging in earnest.
The US was the only Anglo-Saxon country to experience outright private sector deleveraging in the crisis, with private debt falling from a peak of $US42.3 trillion in January 2009 to $38.9 trillion in June 2010. Since then it has flatlined – it was $38.8 trillion in September 2012. The danger of which politicians on both sides of the House are blithely ignorant is that attempts to reduce the government deficit – and thus slow the rate of growth of government debt – could cause the private sector to return to deleveraging again. Rather than stimulating the economy by getting the government out of the way, “fiscal consolidation” could renew “private consolidation” and push the economy back into recession, as it did in 1937.
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs. ... nt&src=sph I tend to be more sanguine about reducing public expenditures than Keen, real deleveraging can't happen until we get a cold dose of austerity. But it's gonna hurt