by MrBill » Wed 05 Dec 2007, 04:28:57
I am referring to the policy response of the Treasury's plans to put a 90-moratorium on foreclosures and the plan that is on the table to hold down re-fixable mortgage rates at their low teaser rates for as long as 5-7 years. Doing a MOF! [sup]TM[/sup]
That will drag out the adjustment process; postpone the write-off of bad loans; depress new lending as capital is tied-up; suppress a recovery in lending margins as banks have less capital with which to make new loans at new higher market rates; and along with the Fed easing inspite of inflationary forces elsewhere in the 'US dollar zone' it appears that they are losing their inflation fighting credentials. Doing a BOJ! [sup]TM[/sup]
UPDATE:
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'I')f you're like me, you've spent the last few days sorting through the sketchy outline of the U.S. Treasury's subprime rescue plan and mulling the potentialimpact. (Hey, I never said I was a swinger!)
We learned last week that Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was working with the mortgage industry and major financial institutions to craft a plan to freeze introductory teaser rates on certain subprime mortgages that are due to reset higher, as specified by the original terms of the loan.
Such a plan is easier said that done.
In the old days, a mortgage lender -- in many cases, your local banker -- had a relationship with the borrower. When a homeowner fell upon hard times, he and his banker would sit down to renegotiate the loan. It was in the interest of both the homeowner (he keeps the house) and the banker (he avoids costly foreclosure) to modify the loan terms.
Nowadays, subprime loans are bundled, sold, chopped up into pieces and packaged into collateralized debt obligations. The lender -- in this case, the owner of a CDO tranche -- has been replaced by a Cayman Islands hedge fund, a Florida municipality or a German bank. Their interests aren't necessarily aligned with those of the homeowner, not to mention one another.
The investor who owns the AAA-rated CDO tranche and is first in line to get paid has no motivation to support a modification of the underlying loans; the holder of the residual tranche does.
Source: Caroline Baum, Bloomberg, December 4, 2007
Publicly traded banks are making the write-downs probably because they have been very profitable and have the reserves to make those write-downs. Plus they have an obligation to mark to market their tradable securities.
However, what about other financial players that can choose not to mark to market their strategic portfolios if they are classed as buy and hold even though they may contain the same securities of the banks?
It is these non-bank financial institutions that bought the risk that banks did not want on their own balance sheets. Where is it now? Have they publicly disclosed their losses or exposures? Or set aside reserves to deal with this problem that has long since become larger than merely a subprime crisis?
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', '
')Florida officials are going to meet today to talk about the crisis in the state's Local Government Investment Pool. I don't know what they are going to talk about, but I know what they had better decide.
The State Board of Administration runs the pool, and its three trustees, Governor Charlie Crist, Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink and Attorney General Bill McCollum, had better decide that it's in the best interest of the state to ensure that all of the pool participants get their money back.
The investment pool, which contained $27 billion this summer, now has $14 billion, the result of withdrawals by municipalities with keenly developed senses of self- preservation. On Nov. 29 the board told the remaining participants they couldn't withdraw any more money from the pool.
The pool, which is where most of the state's municipalities put their money when they are not using it, owns $1.5 billion in securities that have been downgraded or defaulted as a result of the subprime market collapse.
In freezing the pool, Coleman Stipanovich, executive director of the board, said, ``If we don't do something quickly, we're not going to have an investment pool.''
The state stopped the clock.
The same clock is ticking for every state in the country where school districts and cities and towns put their faith in someone else, usually at the county or state level, to manage their money.
What's It Worth?
This means, I think, most of them.
Of course, that's the problem with Muniland in general:
Nobody ever really knows precisely what's going on when a crisis like this hits. There might be as many as 100 pools like this across the nation, with assets of something like $200 billion.
Edit: Except LoneSnark perhaps? They are supposed to offer daily liquidity for the public sector in much the same way that money-market funds do for the private sector. They are supposed to invest their clients' money in the safest possible securities, good old boring things like U.S. Treasuries, top-rated commercial paper and certificates of deposit.
It seems, however, that some of the commercial paper investments the Florida pool, and others like it across the country, purchased were backed by subprime mortgages and other things that have declined precipitously in value.
The people who manage the funds find themselves in the position of not being able to figure out exactly what the assets are worth, because they don't trade, or don't trade much, and no one seems to know what the stuff is.
Cents on the Dollar
Got that? Neither do I. Let me try this again. These state and county-sponsored pools invested in highly rated short-term securities that were subsequently downgraded really fast or even went into default because of the subprime disaster.
When word somehow gets out that the pools own this stuff, either because the pools themselves 'fess up or because some enterprising reporter drags the information out of them with open-records requests, pool participants withdraw their money.
If enough participants withdraw, the pools will have to sell some of that stuff that nobody can figure out what it's worth. You can bet that Wall Street, which packaged and sold the stuff in the first place, isn't going to offer 100 cents on the dollar for it.
This means that not everyone will get all their money back. On Nov. 30, an advisory panel of local governments in the Florida pool held a conference call with members of the State Board of Administration.
The SBA put out a ``Preferences Survey'' for discussion, and Question No. 1 was ``What percent of your current holding would you withdraw in December 2007, if it meant you would receive 99 cents on the dollar?'' The next three questions were exactly the same, except with 98 cents on the dollar, 95 cents on the dollar and 90 cents on the dollar.
Eyes on Florida
The municipal officials on the call would have none of it. They want 100 cents on the dollar. Anything less, they said, would be unacceptable.
They were a pretty conciliatory and reasonable bunch. They kept saying that what was needed was to restore confidence and trust in the fund. Most said they did not have immediate needs - -such as covering payroll or making debt-service payments -- and that they thought some provision should be made for the smaller municipalities among them who did.
The key word here, of course, is trust, and that is in very short supply at the moment. The state might make a real statement today, and assure municipalities that the great subprime meltdown of 2007 won't swallow them up.
Or it can let them all dangle. I have a feeling other municipalities across the nation will be watching, ready to reach for the telephone and bring their own deposits home.
source: Dec. 4 (Bloomberg)
Investment banks like Goldman Sachs estimate that losses stemming from the subprime market that have now spread into other CDOs and CP programs may have the effect of draining $2 trillion in lending from the banking system. The money multiplier effect going into reverse.
Of course, the Fed can lower rates, and encourage new borrowing by excepting lower rated junk as repo collateral, while the government lead by the Treasury's plan coerces lenders into keeping defacto defaulters in their homes, but this hardly solves the underlying problem that the original crisis was started by poor lending decisions and too much credit in the first place. It merely drags it out for years to come.
occured when asset prices could no longer be pumped-up any higher. Not even with a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP), so they had to correct lower. That did not cause the 'the worst recession since the Great Depression',
to me! Will it look exactly the same? Probably not. Every economic downturn looks different. Will it be shallow and painless? Probably not.