by MrBill » Fri 10 Aug 2007, 03:21:31
It is easier to buy an asset than to fund an asset, and if you borrow money, you have to generate a positive return on investment to payback that loan with interest.
Many banks, like BNP Paribas, are sitting on 'assets' that they cannot sell. Or they do not want to sell them in the current climate at a loss. But they still have to fund these assets.
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', ' ')But that comforting outlook did not help the credit markets recover, or persuade anyone to buy the newly questioned securities — at least at anything like the prices people had assumed. No one wants to sell the securities at very low prices — and in many cases they have borrowed heavily against them. So the markets have dried up.
Source: NYTimes.com
So with stock markets falling and bond spreads widening it is not a good time for them to tap the capital markets. There are no investors willing and able to step in at this point and buy new debt or equity.
Therefore, the only option left for banks is the interbank money market. However, as this is a fixed pool of money, and everyone is going over-weight cash at the moment either by selling fixed income or equity, so the cost of money is going up.
When the cost of over-night funds in the money market goes up too much, primary dealers or banks that can deal directly with the central bank, will go to the Open Window to take money market funds directly from the central bank.
But the central bank has a target rate, 5.25% p.a. for the Fed and 4.25% for the ECB, they are forced to release more money supply than they would like to OR raise their target rate.
It is the mandate of the central bank to be 'the lender of last resort'. And they are there to calm markets when they get over-active to aid in market stability.
Just like the CB can mop-up excess liquidity when there is too much money supply, which is inflationary, so too can they add liquidity when it is necessary.
As we all know that one of the off-shoots of fractional banking is that there are more loans in existance than physical money to back them, so the central bank has to be ready at all times to avoid runs on the financial institutions by being ready to release more money into the banking system to match short-term liquidity gaps if depositors want to withdraw money.
The amount banks can withdraw from the CB is limited by their ability to repay those loans with interest. If they are borrowing money at 4.25% or 5.25% to fund assets that are losing their value like CDOs or stocks then it will be very hard for them to repay those loans to the CB with interest. So at a certain point in time they will obviously be forced to sell what liquid assets they have to cover their funding gap, and to cut their losses. Those that do not will either go bankrupt or become take-over targets by their competitors.
By historical standards risk spreads are still very narrow. The market is just in the process of re-pricing that risk back into the financial system. If I use EUR/JPY as a proxy for global risk taking due to the yen carry trade that funded many of these risky bets then we have fallen from almost 169 to 161 now. That is just 4-5%. EUR/JPY was 150 at the start of the year and even then yen was under-valued by 40% against the euro. It clearly has a lot farther to fall as those yen carry trades are unwound. And it is probably necessary. The question being whether it will be orderly or not?
Having lived through several 'currency crises' (EMU, CZK, RUB, etc.) as an interbank FX trader/market maker yesterday's intervention by the ECB neither surprised nor alarmed me. On a scale of one to ten it was a non-event.
That is not to say this liquidity crisis, and I use the term very loosely, is over or that it could not get worse. But most European banks have reported healthy H1'07 profits already. As for the pension funds I would not be as sanguine. I think that is where the real mess is hidden? A lot of them had holes in the balance sheets before this CDO crisis stemming from stock market losses in 2000, along with low yields on bonds since then, so many of them bought these high yielding derivatives in an attempt to close their gap between current assets and future liabilities. This latest blow-up is rather likely to set them back yet once again.
August 15th will be a key date. That is when many investors can withdraw funds from mutual and hedge funds. Asset and portfolio managers may then find themselves having to sell assets come what may? Next week we'll know.
UPDATE:
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'B')ut a new financial architecture emerged in the last decade — one that relied more on securities and less on banks as intermediaries. With the worth of those securities now being questioned — and no equivalent of deposit insurance — some who financed the securities want their money out, a fact that has created the 21st-century equivalent of a run on a bank.
Left to deal with the run are the institutions that were created to deal with the old system’s problems — notably the central banks like the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. But, in contrast to their close involvement with the banking system, these banks have little regulatory oversight of the securities that are in trouble and may not even know who is holding them.
At the heart of the new system was a decision to have loans financed directly by investors, rather than indirectly by bank depositors. Investors, ranging from hedge funds to wealthy individuals, had confidence in the arrangement because most of the securities were blessed as very safe by the bond rating agencies, like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
The highly rated securities pay relatively low interest rates, but until now there were many willing to own them or to lend money to those who did own them. But there is no reason to hold them if there is any question about their safety — just as there was no reason to keep deposits in a bank that was facing a run amid rumors about its safety.