by Carlhole » Sun 21 Sep 2008, 17:49:02
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('Plantagenet', 'C')all it the revenge of Enron. The collapse of Enron in 2002 triggered a wave of regulations, most notably Sarbanes-Oxley. Less noticed but ultimately more consequential for today were accounting rules that forced financial service companies to change the way they report the value of their assets (or liabilities).
I think virtually everybody agrees that the present crisis has been caused by the bursting of a huge housing bubble followed by a sudden credit contraction, falling home prices, defaulted mortgages which, in turn, affect the value of securities based upon mortgages.
The bubble was created through (1) the Fed's policy of extremely low interest rates, (2) by a lack of GSE oversight into the qualifications of buyers, (3) and by a lack of oversight into the creation of derivatives based upon mortgages.
This latest bailout is going to cost the taxpayer $700 billion+ and you say this is due to accounting rules? Nowhere else has anyone mentioned Sarbanes-Oxley in relation to this deadly serious financial catastrophe. Henry Paulson was on
Meet The Press today and did not mention Sarbanes-Oxley.
You chose the ONLY article to relate arcane accounting rules to the present financial catastrophe. And, even then, your article restricted itself to AIG and not the larger disaster. In fact, today on
Meet The Press,
Henry Paulson described AIG as a "hedge fund holding company sitting on top of a bunch of insurance companies with no oversight". Well, the whole POINT of Sarbanes-Oxley is governing how accounting firms in an oversight capacity report. So there CANNOT have been any significant contribution to the disaster by accounting rules adopted in 2002.
Paulson went on to recommend
regulatory actions once the market stabilized.
Ron Paul could see this bubble and its eventual collapse many years ago. He wrote this piece in 2003 forecasting the bursting of the housing bubble:
Fannie and Freddie$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('Ron Paul', 'O')ne of the major government privileges granted to GSEs is a line of credit with the United States Treasury. According to some estimates, the line of credit may be worth over $2 billion. This explicit promise by the Treasury to bail out GSEs in times of economic difficulty helps the GSEs attract investors who are willing to settle for lower yields than they would demand in the absence of the subsidy. Thus, the line of credit distorts the allocation of capital. More importantly, the line of credit is a promise on behalf of the government to engage in a huge unconstitutional and immoral income transfer from working Americans to holders of GSE debt.
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'T')he connection between the GSEs and the government helps isolate the GSE management from market discipline. This isolation from market discipline is the root cause of the recent reports of mismanagement occurring at Fannie and Freddie. After all, if Fannie and Freddie were not underwritten by the federal government, investors would demand Fannie and Freddie provide assurance that they follow accepted management and accounting practices.
Ironically, by transferring the risk of a widespread mortgage default, the government increases the likelihood of a painful crash in the housing market. This is because the special privileges granted to Fannie and Freddie have distorted the housing market by allowing them to attract capital they could not attract under pure market conditions. As a result, capital is diverted from its most productive use into housing. This reduces the efficacy of the entire market and thus reduces the standard of living of all Americans.
Despite the long-term damage to the economy inflicted by the government's interference in the housing market, the government's policy of diverting capital to other uses creates a short-term boom in housing. Like all artificially-created bubbles, the boom in housing prices cannot last forever. When housing prices fall, homeowners will experience difficulty as their equity is wiped out. Furthermore, the holders of the mortgage debt will also have a loss. These losses will be greater than they would have otherwise been had government policy not actively encouraged over-investment in housing.