Page added on March 25, 2017
Big Oil is muscling in on shale country.
ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron are jumping into American shale with gusto, planning to spend a combined $10 billion this year, up from next to nothing only a few years ago.
The giants are gaining a foothold in West Texas with such projects as Bongo 76-43, a well that is being drilled 10,000 feet beneath the table-flat, sage-scented desert and then extends horizontally for a mile, blasting through rock to capture light crude from the sprawling Permian Basin.
While the first chapter of the U.S. shale revolution belonged to wildcatters such as Harold Hamm and the late Aubrey McClendon, who parlayed borrowed money into billions, Bongo 76-43 is financed by Shell.
If the big boys are successful, they’ll scramble the U.S. energy business, boost American oil production, keep prices low and steal influence from big producers such as Saudi Arabia. And even with their enviable balance sheets, the majors have been as relentless in transforming shale drilling into a more economical operation as the pioneering wildcatters before them.
“We’ve turned shale drilling from art into science,” Cindy Taff, Shell’s vice president of unconventional wells, said on a recent visit to Bongo 76-43, about 100 miles west of Midland, Texas, capital of the Permian.
Bongo 76-43, named for an African antelope, is an example of a leaner, faster industry nicknamed “Shale 2.0” after the 2014 oil-price crash. Traditionally, oil companies drilled one well per pad — the flat area they clear to put in the rig. At Bongo 76-43, Shell is drilling five wells in a single pad for the first time, each about 20 feet apart. That saves money otherwise spent moving rigs from site to site.
Shell said it’s now able to drill 16 wells with a single rig every year, up from six in 2013.
With multiple wells on the same pad, a single fracking crew can work several weeks consecutively without having to travel from one pad to another. At Bongo 76-43, Shell is using three times as much sand and fluids to break up the shale, a process called fracking, than it did four years ago. The company said it spends about $5.5 million per well today in the Permian, down nearly 60 percent from 2013.
“We’re literally down to measuring efficiency in minutes, rather than hours or days,” said Bryan Boyles, Bongo 76-43’s manager.
Independent companies are watching the big three’s arrival with ambivalence. Exxon, Shell and Chevron will be able to spend more than independents can for service contracts and prime drilling acreage. But if the majors pursue acquisition deals, as they’ve done before, the wildcatters stand to reap the benefits.
Exxon invested big in shale in 2010 when it bought XTO Energy Inc. in a deal valued at $41 billion. For years, however, the major companies spent little on shale, instead focusing on their traditional turf: multibillion-dollar engineering marvels in the middle of nowhere that took years to build. The wells that Big Oil drilled were mostly in deep water, where a single hole could cost $100 million, rather than shale wells that can be set up for as little as $5 million each.
All that changed after oil prices crashed in 2014. Big companies were forced to cut costs and focus on projects that delivered cash quickly and could easily be sped up or slowed down. Shale was the solution.
“The arrival of Big Oil is very significant for shale,” said Deborah Byers, U.S. energy leader at consultant Ernst & Young in Houston. “It marries a great geological resource with a very strong balance sheet.”
The big three have all hatched ambitious catch-up strategies. Shell plans to spend about $2.5 billion a year, or about one-tenth of its total spending — a bet that’s bigger than those of some pure-play shale companies such as Hamm’s Continental Resources Inc.
“The majors arrived late,” said Greg Guidry, who runs Shell’s shale business. “We want to be as nimble as the independents but levering the capabilities of a major.”
Chevron said it estimates its shale output will increase as much as 30 percent per year for the next decade, with production expanding to 500,000 barrels a day by 2020, from about 100,000 now. “We can see production above 700,000 barrels a day within a decade,” Chevron Chief Executive Officer John Watson told investors this month.
Exxon said it plans to spend one-third of its drilling budget this year on shale, with a goal to lift output to nearly 800,000 barrels a day by 2025, up from less than 200,000 barrels now. The company doubled its Permian footprint with a $6.6 billion acquisition of properties from the billionaire Bass family. Darren Woods, Exxon’s new CEO, said shale isn’t “on a discovery mode, it’s in an extraction mode.”
The price of oil is starting to reflect rising U.S. output. West Texas Intermediate, the national benchmark, this month dropped below $50 a barrel for the first time this year, down 10 percent from its 2017 peak.
Big Oil’s dive into shale could weaken the hand of Saudi Arabia and other big exporters by raising U.S. output. Economically, the countries would have to contend with lower oil prices. Geopolitically, their share of the global energy market would fall, and the U.S. would depend less on foreign supplies.
U.S. domestic production is likely to top 10 million barrels a day by December 2018, a level surpassed only twice, in October and November 1970, according to the Energy Information Administration.
Some investors remain unconvinced. Shale, they argue, is a very different business for the big companies. Huge projects, their mainstays, require a big upfront investment before becoming cash cows for decades with relatively little spending. Shale, on the other hand, requires ongoing spending because output quickly falls after an initial burst.
Guidry, head of Shell’s shale, said the company could make money in the Permian with oil at $40 a barrel, with new wells profitable at about $20 a barrel.
A lesson of the oil-price crash was how important it was to keep cash on hand. The independents typically overspent, taking on debt to keep drilling, so when prices fell, they slowed their operations. The big three will experience no such pinch, said Bryan Sheffield, the billionaire third-generation oilman who heads Parsley Energy Inc.
“Big Oil is cash-flow positive, so they can take a longer-term view,” Sheffield said. “You’re going to see them investing more in shale.”
7 Comments on "Oil giants upending American shale turf"
Cloggie on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 3:45 am
America entering the Third Carbon Age:
https://www.thenation.com/article/third-carbon-age/
Fine with me. Gives Europe a competitive edge in renewable energy technology. The new Seven Sisters of renewable energy business will likely be European, followed by Chinese.
https://deepresource.wordpress.com/2017/01/11/ten-largest-wind-turbines-to-date/
And being a leader in a branch of energy technology has geopolitical repercussions, as demonstrated by Britain in the 19th century with coal and America in the 20th century with oil.
rockman on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 7:58 am
Let’s see if Shell Oil does better in its new shale venture the it did a when it went big in the Eagle Ford Shale in S Texas. It paid $1 BILLION for a single lease and the very quickly drilled 150+ wells. Just a guess but another $1.5+ billion invested. When the Rockman pulled the INITIAL production of the wells completed at that time the wells averaged only 80 bopd. Compare that to several hundreds bopd from other portions of the trend. As a result Shell announced it was pulling out of all US shale plays. Shell sold the EFS busted play to a Little Oil for $700 million. And no too long afterwards oil prices collapsed and pushed that Little Oil close to bankruptcy.
Apparently it has changed its mind. The no doubt have a very good looking exploration model for its new play. Maybe almost as good as exploration model that led it to investing almost $3 BILLION in that S Texas Eagle Ford Shale adventure. But probably not as good as the exploration model that convinced it to spend $2+ BILLION on that Arctic dry hole. And Devon had a great looking exploration model for the last Deep Water Brazil well the Rockman consulted on: a $154 million dry hole. Eventually Devon sold out its multi-BILLION investment in the trend in an effort to avoid bankruptcy. Luckily for Devon (like Shell Oil) it sold before the price collapse.
Nothing wrong with speculating about the future of a new play but no point in debating it now. Eventually the results will show whether those expectations are full of sh*t or not. LOL.
Boat on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 10:35 am
Shell claiming new wells are profitable at $20 seems to good to be true.
The idea having deep pockets to keep drilling when priciest are down seems crazy. At a point you can’t drill for a profit, why drill at all. Ask the producers that went bankrupt.
rockman on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 1:46 pm
Well, deep pockets won’t typically let a company drill if the average well loses money. OTOH pubcos, especially Big Oil pubcos, put a great value on adding reserves even if the profit margin isn’t very impressive. No one will know the ultimate profitability of current drilling programs for years. But the reserves added to the books (following the SEC regs) will show up much sooner. As well as any increases in revenue that will also be known immediately.
As I mentioned before the Rockman once drilled 4 horizontal wells in reservoirs that were producing slowly. This very small pubco’s production increased from 10 million cuft of NG to 50 million cuft. Those wells cost a total of $18 million. But the NPV (Net Present Value) of accelerating the production was less then that cost. Thus on a NPV basis the company actually lost value. But the stock market doesn’t dig that deep into such details. But it easily saw that huge production/revenue increase and the stock increased from $0.75 to $5 per share.
Yes: drilling wells that decreased the net value of the company resulted in a huge increase in stock value. The managers were happy, the board of directors were happy, the shareholders that sold out after the surge were happy and the consulting Rockman that got a very nice bonus was happy. The new shareholders who watched the company’s value fall until is disappeared forever after filing bankruptcy were not very happy.
Turns out those boring technical details of oil development actually do matter. Who would have thought? LOL.
Nony on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 4:15 pm
“NPV” already includes investment cost, Rock. The “N” is net. All of the cash flows in or out are discounted back to the beginning (using the weighted cost of capital). Anything positive is a good project. Anything negative is bad. (If that is all you have, return the money to shareholders.)
On a typical project, you can imagine a big upfront investment (at “year zero”) and then cash returns over the coming years discounted back to year zero).
This is basic MBA stuff. I know it the way you know mudlogging. You have been exposed to it since any manager in a company is exposed to it. But you are not an expert on it. I know it through and through.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XmiS1qA3u4Y
Rockman on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 6:30 pm
Nony – Yes, old wise one. Did you not follow the part about the NPV deceasing? The horizontal wells were going to recover the same reserves a the existing vertical reserves. IOW the URR did not increase as a result of the hz wells. They were going to be recovered faster. Which means their NPV was higher then it was if the vertical wells alone produced the reservoirs. But that increase in NPV was LESS THAN THE $18 MILLION SPENT TO DRILL THE HZ WELLS.
So yes: on paper the company lost about $6 million when the book value of the company was recalculated. Not the least of the company problems: they also issued a $100 million bond at 11% and used it to pay off an 8% revolver with the bank. Makes sense to you? It would if you were trying to downgrade the company’s value to fight off an hostile take over. A taker over effort based upon its great “success” increasing production. BTW the company was never going pay back the bond. After the bond crashed it was bought for $0.55 on the dollar. We paid back the $55 million to the bond holder and then he sent the company into bankruptcy to get the carry forward loss to take advantage of the write off.
Not a pretty picture, eh? LOL
Nony on Sun, 26th Mar 2017 11:16 pm
Rock, your story was basically fine and I get the point. It is just a terminology issue. No big issue. NPV already reflects the investment cost. N is net.
So it is not the NPV was less than investment cost, but that NPV was negative (because future cash flows, discounted back, were less than upfront investment). Or PV was less than investment. But not NPV. That was simply negative. As per the video. Watch it.