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Page added on April 1, 2014

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Power Plants Too Big to Fail?

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The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) was closed abruptly in February 2012. During the previous decade, SONGS had produced about 8% of the electricity generated in California, so its closure had a pronounced impact on California’s wholesale electricity market, requiring large and immediate increases in generation from other sources.

In a new EI@Haas Working Paper titled, “The Value of Transmission in Electricity Markets: Evidence from a Nuclear Power Plant Closure”, we use publicly available data to examine the impact of the closure on economic and environmental outcomes. Because of the plant’s size and prominence, the closure provides a valuable natural experiment for learning about firm behavior in electricity markets.

Aerial_San_Onofre_Generating_Station_May_2012

We find that the SONGS closure increased the cost of electricity generation by $370 million during the first twelve months. This is a large change, equivalent to a 15% increase in total generation costs. The SONGS closure also had important implications for the environment, increasing carbon dioxide emissions by 9.2 million tons over the same period. Valued at $35 per ton (IWG 2013), this is $330 million worth of emissions, the equivalent of putting more than 2 million additional cars on the road.

The closure was particularly challenging because of SONGS’ location in a load pocket between Los Angeles and San Diego. Transmission constraints and other physical limitations of the grid mean that a substantial portion of Southern California’s generation must be met locally. When SONGS closed, these constraints began to bind, essentially segmenting the California market. The figure below shows the price difference at 3 p.m. on weekdays between Southern and Northern California. After the closure there were many more days with positive differentials, including a small number of days in which prices in the South exceeded prices in the North by more than $40 per megawatt hour.

SONGS_Fig2

These binding transmission constraints meant that it was not always possible to meet the lost output from SONGS using the lowest cost available generating resources. Southern plants were used too much, and Northern plants weren’t used enough. Of the $370 million in increased generation costs, we attribute about $40 million to transmission constraints and other physical limitations of the grid. This number is less precisely estimated than the overall impact, but is particularly interesting in that it provides a measure of the value of transmission.

The paper provides all the gory details about how we made these calculations. It turns out to be more difficult than a simple before-and-after comparison because during this period the California market was also experiencing a whole set of simultaneous changes to hydroelectric resources, renewables, demand, and fuel prices. What is helpful, however, is that transmission constraints were rarely binding prior to the closure. This means that observed behavior during the pre-period provides a good sense of how firms would have behaved during the post-period had there not been transmission constraints.

Our findings provide empirical support for long-held views about the importance of transmission constraints in electricity markets (Bushnell 1999; Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft 2000; Joskow and Tirole 2000), and contribute to a growing broader literature on the economic impacts of infrastructure investments (Jensen 2007, Banerjee, Duflo and Qian 2012, Borenstein and Kellogg 2014).

The episode also illustrates the challenges of designing deregulated electricity markets. A new book chapter by Frank Wolak (here) argues that while competition may improve efficiency, it also introduces cost in the form of greater complexity and need for monitoring. Transmission constraints add an additional layer to this complexity, by implicitly shrinking the size of the market. Constraints increase the scope for non-competitive behavior, but only for certain plants during certain high-demand periods, so understanding and mitigating market power in these contexts is difficult and requires a sophisticated system operator.

energy at haas



3 Comments on "Power Plants Too Big to Fail?"

  1. Davy, Hermann, MO on Tue, 1st Apr 2014 4:17 pm 

    I have made mention of the market distortions gas is fueling in the electricity market nationwide. My point has been we must be very careful putting all our eggs in one basket and or crippling on support pillar that could make the whole system unstable. If we retire too many or to rapidly our coal and nuk plant assets we risk unintended consequences. This is especially true with AltE with its complexity from variability and gas with the huge question of economic supply security. I am against deregulation of the energy markets. We have seen time and time again when commodities are traded by the banksters the trades are manipulated and do not represent true price discovery. In effect deregulation is a parasitic drag on an already complex system. If we should be doing anything it is making the grid less complex and more dispersed. Since that is not going to happen from the top down because the system is rigged, corrupt, manipulated and lacks legal regard let us hope the bottom up we see a build out of end user AltE. The SONGS plant appears from my reading to have been a basket case of poor design, location, and management. I am not arguing against the decommissioning of this nuk plant. I am making a macro across the nation statement that we must be aware of the dangers posed by any large scale actions with electricity supply. A complex system often exhibits feedbacks from major actions within the system. I feel we cannot rely on the market in the case of the security or our electrical generation. This is especially true today with most markets rigged, distorted, corrupted and a disregard for laws and regulations.

  2. J-Gav on Tue, 1st Apr 2014 7:45 pm 

    I agree Davy – phase-outs in the transition cannot be too hasty, otherwise the energy apple-cart will be turned on hits head. It needs to be smooth and steady but of course there’s no guarantee of that.

    As for the title question: Euh, not all power plants are too big to fail. Proof? Texas leader Energy Future Holdings is on the verge of declaring bankruptcy. They own 14 power plants.

  3. meld on Tue, 1st Apr 2014 8:07 pm 

    Everything is too big to fail now. Supermarkets, energy companies, transport companies, shipping companies, film studios etc etc etc. It’s all getting nationalised and we’ll all wake up in some dreary socialist nightmare of scraping out an existence. Personally I’d rather a big fast crash and chaos but sadly that won’t happen

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