PeakOil is You
Black Friday--This One's For You Rocc
Re: Black Friday--This One's For You Rocc
by VMarcHart » Fri 10 Oct 2008, 12:45:22
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('Olaf', 'G')iven new developments, both Rocc and Cashmere have decided to say their goodbyes.
Oh, so soon?On 9/29/08, cube wrote: "The Dow will drop to 4,000 within 2 years". The current tally is 239 bold predictions, 9 right, 96 wrong, 134 open. If you've heard here, it's probably wrong.
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VMarcHart - Heavy Crude
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Re: Black Friday--This One's For You Rocc
by ROCKMAN » Fri 10 Oct 2008, 13:04:11
I'm with you V. The really interesting phase is just beginning. Just imagine what the chatter will be like around here in 12 months.
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ROCKMAN - Expert
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Re: Black Friday--This One's For You Rocc
by rdsaltpower » Sat 11 Oct 2008, 00:27:59
I agree with jlw61. I am going to have to get the hell away from the elect. media and take a day w/family. This week has been the hardest week on me mentally in recent memory. Hell I feel like I've been on an emotional rollacoster and couldn't get off. Im gonna turn the shit off, gather up the wife and kid and go some where for a day. See you guys on black tuesday!
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rdsaltpower - Peat
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Re: Black Friday--This One's For You Rocc
by DantesPeak » Sat 11 Oct 2008, 10:30:12
The worst week ever for US market investors, ending with a scary Black Friday, now in retrospect appears to have been made worse by fraud and deceit.
Even though as far back as 2004 we discussed a possible housing and credit collapse here, the magnitude of corporate deception has been astounding. Just how could F & F, AIG, and Lehman have hidden losses hundreds of billions $s each so long if they had fairly valued their assets?
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'O')CTOBER 11, 2008 Documents Show AIG Knew Of Problems With Valuations
By LIAM PLEVEN and AMIR EFRATI
Top officials at American International Group Inc. knew of potential problems in valuing derivative contracts long before these risky transactions caused the insurer's shareholders severe pain, according to documents released by congressional investigators.
The disclosures come as prospects dimmed this past week for AIG's efforts to quickly sell assets to repay its bulging debt to the government. The derivative-contract problems would have driven AIG into bankruptcy; in the past month, the government has made available to AIG nearly $123 billion in a rescue plan.
A federal criminal probe under way since earlier this year is also looking at how candid company executives were with investors at a December 2007 investor conference and whether executives at AIG's financial-products unit, which sold derivatives contracts, misled AIG's outside auditor last fall.
At congressional hearings Tuesday, a former internal AIG auditor wrote that he had early on raised concerns about being excluded from conversations about the valuation of the derivatives. The auditor, Joseph St. Denis, wrote in a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that in early September 2007, he learned that AIG's financial-products unit had been asked for billions of dollars in collateral related to derivatives it had sold.
Even though as far back as 2004 we discussed a possible housing and credit collapse here, the magnitude of corporate deception has been astounding. Just how could F & F, AIG, and Lehman have hidden losses hundreds of billions $s each so long if they had fairly valued their assets?
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'O')CTOBER 11, 2008 Documents Show AIG Knew Of Problems With Valuations
By LIAM PLEVEN and AMIR EFRATI
Top officials at American International Group Inc. knew of potential problems in valuing derivative contracts long before these risky transactions caused the insurer's shareholders severe pain, according to documents released by congressional investigators.
The disclosures come as prospects dimmed this past week for AIG's efforts to quickly sell assets to repay its bulging debt to the government. The derivative-contract problems would have driven AIG into bankruptcy; in the past month, the government has made available to AIG nearly $123 billion in a rescue plan.
A federal criminal probe under way since earlier this year is also looking at how candid company executives were with investors at a December 2007 investor conference and whether executives at AIG's financial-products unit, which sold derivatives contracts, misled AIG's outside auditor last fall.
At congressional hearings Tuesday, a former internal AIG auditor wrote that he had early on raised concerns about being excluded from conversations about the valuation of the derivatives. The auditor, Joseph St. Denis, wrote in a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that in early September 2007, he learned that AIG's financial-products unit had been asked for billions of dollars in collateral related to derivatives it had sold.
WSJ
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'O')CTOBER 11, 2008 Lehman Swap Payments Look Bigger Than Expected
By SERENA NG, EMILY BARRETT and JACOB BUNGE
Banks, hedge funds and other institutions that sold credit-default swaps on now-defaulted Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. may have to pay out more than $91 for every $100 of debt they insured, a larger sum than some expected.
The payouts, which have to be made by Oct. 21, were determined Friday in an auction that saw Wall Street dealers and banks submitting bids to derive a price for an estimated $400 billion in credit-default swaps on Lehman's debt. The swaps are insurance-like contracts that require sellers to make payouts if bonds or loans default.
Before Lehman filed for bankruptcy-court protection on Sept. 15, swap sellers were accepting up to $8 annually to insure every $100 in Lehman debt, in part because they didn't expect the firm to collapse. The default caused some swap sellers to incur significant losses, but analysts believe most institutions had partially hedged their positions and should be able to meet their obligations under the contracts.
Buyers and sellers of Lehman swaps included more than 350 institutions such as the Government of Singapore Investment Corp., AIG Financial Products and many banks and hedge funds, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
WSJ
It's already over, now it's just a matter of adjusting.
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DantesPeak - Expert
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Re: Black Friday--This One's For You Rocc
by BigTex » Sat 11 Oct 2008, 11:04:22
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('DantesPeak', 'T')he worst week ever for US market investors, ending with a scary Black Friday, now in retrospect appears to have been made worse by fraud and deceit.
Even though as far back as 2004 we discussed a possible housing and credit collapse here, the magnitude of corporate deception has been astounding. Just how could F & F, AIG, and Lehman have hidden losses hundreds of billions $s each so long if they had fairly valued their assets?
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'O')CTOBER 11, 2008 Documents Show AIG Knew Of Problems With Valuations
By LIAM PLEVEN and AMIR EFRATI
Top officials at American International Group Inc. knew of potential problems in valuing derivative contracts long before these risky transactions caused the insurer's shareholders severe pain, according to documents released by congressional investigators.
The disclosures come as prospects dimmed this past week for AIG's efforts to quickly sell assets to repay its bulging debt to the government. The derivative-contract problems would have driven AIG into bankruptcy; in the past month, the government has made available to AIG nearly $123 billion in a rescue plan.
A federal criminal probe under way since earlier this year is also looking at how candid company executives were with investors at a December 2007 investor conference and whether executives at AIG's financial-products unit, which sold derivatives contracts, misled AIG's outside auditor last fall.
At congressional hearings Tuesday, a former internal AIG auditor wrote that he had early on raised concerns about being excluded from conversations about the valuation of the derivatives. The auditor, Joseph St. Denis, wrote in a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that in early September 2007, he learned that AIG's financial-products unit had been asked for billions of dollars in collateral related to derivatives it had sold.
Even though as far back as 2004 we discussed a possible housing and credit collapse here, the magnitude of corporate deception has been astounding. Just how could F & F, AIG, and Lehman have hidden losses hundreds of billions $s each so long if they had fairly valued their assets?
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'O')CTOBER 11, 2008 Documents Show AIG Knew Of Problems With Valuations
By LIAM PLEVEN and AMIR EFRATI
Top officials at American International Group Inc. knew of potential problems in valuing derivative contracts long before these risky transactions caused the insurer's shareholders severe pain, according to documents released by congressional investigators.
The disclosures come as prospects dimmed this past week for AIG's efforts to quickly sell assets to repay its bulging debt to the government. The derivative-contract problems would have driven AIG into bankruptcy; in the past month, the government has made available to AIG nearly $123 billion in a rescue plan.
A federal criminal probe under way since earlier this year is also looking at how candid company executives were with investors at a December 2007 investor conference and whether executives at AIG's financial-products unit, which sold derivatives contracts, misled AIG's outside auditor last fall.
At congressional hearings Tuesday, a former internal AIG auditor wrote that he had early on raised concerns about being excluded from conversations about the valuation of the derivatives. The auditor, Joseph St. Denis, wrote in a letter to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform that in early September 2007, he learned that AIG's financial-products unit had been asked for billions of dollars in collateral related to derivatives it had sold.
WSJ
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'O')CTOBER 11, 2008 Lehman Swap Payments Look Bigger Than Expected
By SERENA NG, EMILY BARRETT and JACOB BUNGE
Banks, hedge funds and other institutions that sold credit-default swaps on now-defaulted Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. may have to pay out more than $91 for every $100 of debt they insured, a larger sum than some expected.
The payouts, which have to be made by Oct. 21, were determined Friday in an auction that saw Wall Street dealers and banks submitting bids to derive a price for an estimated $400 billion in credit-default swaps on Lehman's debt. The swaps are insurance-like contracts that require sellers to make payouts if bonds or loans default.
Before Lehman filed for bankruptcy-court protection on Sept. 15, swap sellers were accepting up to $8 annually to insure every $100 in Lehman debt, in part because they didn't expect the firm to collapse. The default caused some swap sellers to incur significant losses, but analysts believe most institutions had partially hedged their positions and should be able to meet their obligations under the contracts.
Buyers and sellers of Lehman swaps included more than 350 institutions such as the Government of Singapore Investment Corp., AIG Financial Products and many banks and hedge funds, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
WSJ
Sarbanes-Oxley did a great job of giving us an early warning, huh?
Consider how much more colossal the failures of Bear Stearns, Fannie, Freddie, AIG, Lehman Brothers, WaMu, Wachovia are when compared to Enron and Worldcom, and how even after Bear Stearns failed no one seemed to appreciate what we had on our hands.
It's comical that such an enormous amount of money has been spent on Sarbanes-Oxley compliance and all of that money was likely wasted on an utterly false sense of security.
