"Consciousness" is an ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena.
Consciousness can be divided into "easy" and "hard" problems. For the
easy problems there are no real issue about whether these phenomena can be explained scientifically. All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms.If these phenomena were all there was to consciousness, then consciousness would not be much of a problem.
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. There is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience that runs parallel and in addition to the computational or neural mechanisms of our physical mind. If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. This 'something it is like to be' is often called "qualia" or "Epiphenomenal" or "phenomenal consciousness". Whatever the name, each of us no doubt intimately experience this first hand every day and moment of our lives. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue or the color of bright red? Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red?
I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take 'experience/quilia/awareness' as fundamental.A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the furniture of the basic laws of nature.
Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place. But this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter, by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience and quilia.
http://www.goertzel.org/dynapsyc/2004/HardProblem.htm
Like I said, "Consciousness" is an ambiguous term, perhaps "quilia" is truly no more than just 'information'? Language is always 'ambiguous' to some degree, but I think we are all talking about the 'same thing' here. The entire universe may have a low level "Consciousness". A rock would be on a much lower level of "Consciousness" than say a chicken, and the chicken would be on a lower level of "Consciousness" than say George Bush. (although I'm not certain about that one..)
Information itself may be "Consciousness" and 'quilia'. Perhaps patterns are self-sustained conciousness!
When a new pattern appears in the universe, a quilia is associated with it. So 'BLUE' the abstract and platonic objective 'BLUE' that is OUT THERE is itself associated with a unique singular and distinct quilia for 'Blue', and 'Red' for 'Red', a certain sensation of pain for that specific pain. etc.