by JohnDenver » Mon 17 Dec 2007, 09:31:47
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('pstarr', 'J')D will use the example of the United States as evidence that moderate decline can be managed and will not have consequence outside its own industry. But this is wrong. He will compare the U.S. (with its onetime super giant fields, record production rates and unimaginable power and wealth) to that other petroleum giant Saudia Arabia, and argue that modern oil fields will decline moderately in a similar fashion. But he will be wrong.
JD will argue that the world's infrastructure and economy can withstand such moderate decline rates (of several percent) experienced in the United States since it oil peak in 1973. JD will be wrong again
Furthermore he will minimize the devastation that serious decline rates of 5% or more, (similar to those artificially induced by the oil embargos and wars of the 1970's) can have on an economy and the social fabric. He can not even fathom what world-wide 8%, 9%, or 12% decline year in and year out forever will do to our civilization.
It is clear to those who bother to study history that the moderate curve of oil production and decline in the United State is an aberration and must be discarded when modeling other oil regimes, including that meta-region planet earth. U.S. petroleum declines rates are the exception and prove nothing about world rates
Pete, the above is just unsubstantiated opinion and posturing.
$this->bbcode_second_pass_quote('', 'T')hat is because U.S. petroleum reserves were explored, developed, produced, and are declining under a completely different regime than the rest of the world. Here in the United States a specific oil field culture framed in a specific historical period (and a consequence of primitive technologies, unique geography, weather, and specific archaic accounting laws) insured that petroleum would be extracted slowly and would conversely decline in a similar fashion.
The slow decline of oil production in the United States (specifically the continental US) is aberrant and not be generalized. Rather look to Mexico and it's supergiant field Cantarell for guidance (declines of 12%), the North Slope and North Sea (8-12%) Yibel, and a host of other regions depleted with great expertise, at great expense, using the most modern technologies available. This is our future.
You're just cherry picking the worst figures you can find, and then waving your hand and saying "That's what the whole world is going to be like." Even the areas you cite aren't as bad as you claim. The EIA C&C stats for Mexico after its peak in 2004 look like this:
2004: 3383kbd
2005: 3334
2006: 3256
2007: 3126
That's an annual decline rate of 2%, not 12% as you are suggesting.
For the North Slope,
stats from the Alaska Tax Division show that liquids production dropped from a peak of 2.006mbd in 1988 to 0.74mbd in 2007. That's an annual decline rate of 5.2%. But, as we know, that was absorbed into U.S. liquids production, which has been declining at a mild rate of 1.3% per annum since 1970.
Yibal (not "Yibel") was one oil field, and it didn't cause oil production in Oman to collapse. Oman dropped from its EIA C&C peak of 970kbd in 2000 to 707kbd today. That's an annual decline rate of 4.4%. Well short of your 8-12%.
UK C&C peaked in 1999 at 2684kbd and today is at 1486kbd, for an annual decline rate of 7.2%.
Furthermore, all of the rapid collapsers you cited were uneventfully absorbed into world C&C production, which has declined from a peak of 74.3mbd in May 2005 to its most recent value of 73.5mbd in Sept. 2007.
That's a mild net decline rate for the world of 0.5% per annum.
Furthermore, we have a
mathematical theory by Stuart Staniford and J. Brown over at the Oil Drum which gives a rationale for a low worldwide post-peak decline rate. This analysis predicts that world decline rates will be less than 2% for more than 20 years after the peak, as shown in this graph:
Note the decline rate predicted for the UK. According to the theory, it should begin at 0 in 1999 (the year of UK's C&C peak) and increase to about 6% in 2007 (8 years later).
The actual decline figures for the UK:
2001: -6%
2002: -1.7%
2003: -8.7%
2004: -8.3%
2005: +3.0%
2006: -4.7%
2007: -4.3%
Certainly a lot of noise in there, but it generally agrees with the theory.
For the U.S., the theory predicts a decline rate less than 3% for 30 years, and that has been the case. The average decline rate for the U.S. has been 1.3% per year.
Simply stating -- without any evidence -- that "The world is going to collapse like Cantarell" doesn't prove anything. Even Mexico (during the collapse of Cantarell!) doesn't collapse like Cantarell, as I've shown.
Small areas collapsing at high rates have very little effect on the world. If Yibal (at 250kbd) collapses in one year, for a decline rate of 100%, the world only drops by 0.3%. Even if Ghawar collapses at 12% a year, that will only shave 0.7% per year off the world total.