China’s Policy in the Gulf Region: From Neglect to Necessity

The I.E.A. predicts that Chinese oil imports from the Middle East will rise to at least 70 percent by 2015, underpinning that the future of the Chinese economy is inextricably tied to the Middle East.

China is a relatively new player in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf in particular. Whereas Egypt was the first Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with China, it was not until 1990 that Beijing had established ties with all of the littoral states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.).

The G.C.C. consists of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar. Throughout the Cold War, China regarded the Persian Gulf states as geographically remote since this was a time when Beijing was focused on consolidating its position in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Partly explaining China’s neglect, Beijing did not pay serious attention to energy security in general and oil security in particular until 1993 when it became a net oil importing country.

Equally, the conservative Gulf monarchies had concentrated their efforts on the United States, fearing the threat of both global communism and Arab nationalism that China paid homage to. Saudi Arabia was the last G.C.C. country to establish ties with China in July 1990. All of its smaller neighbors had exchanged diplomats with China by then, some much earlier: Kuwait on March 22, 1971; Oman on May 25, 1978; the United Arab Emirates on November 1, 1984; Qatar on July 9, 1988; and Bahrain on April 18, 1989.

Sino-G.C.C. relations until recently could be characterized as being generally lackluster and uneventful. This has changed, however, and in the past few years relations have flourished. Most noticeably, Beijing has rapidly widened and extended its links with the region, substantially upgrading economic ties. Arab countries are currently China’s eighth largest trading partner; the Gulf States represent the backbone of the Arab trade bloc.

PINR